Volume 46
Issue 3 Summer
Summer 2006

The Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and Marketing
Water Across State Boundaries
Olen Paul Matthews
Michael Pease

Recommended Citation
Olen P. Matthews & Michael Pease, The Commerce Clause, Interstate Compacts, and Marketing Water
Across State Boundaries, 46 Nat. Resources J. 601 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/nrj/vol46/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UNM Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Natural Resources Journal by an authorized editor of UNM Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu, lsloane@salud.unm.edu, sarahrk@unm.edu.
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The Commerce Clause, Interstate
Compacts, and Marketing Water across
State BoundariesABSTRACT
Increasingcompetition for scarce water resources should lead to a
re-examination of constraints on water reallocation. Some
constraintsare "spatial" in nature and reduce the areal extent of
reallocation processes. Interstate compacts are an example.
Proponents of state protectionism look on compacts as a
permanent allocation of water between states. A willing seller is
not allowed to sell their water to a willing buyer in anotherstate.
On the other hand, the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause
was designed to create an economic union that includes all states
and all citizens. State attempts at economic protectionism
through export bans are generally unconstitutional unless they
can pass one of the limited exceptions to the Commerce Clause.
One potential exception is through the use of interstatecompacts.
The question examined here is to what extent can interstatewater
compacts act as a constraint on water marketing? Allocations
contained within an interstatecompact should be looked on as an
initial allocation of water, not a permanent one. In this article we
examine the Rio Grande Compact in detail and interstate
compacts in general to determine whether compacts place limits
on water markets between states.

*
Olen Paul Matthews is Professor and Chair of Geography at the University of New
Mexico. Michael Pease is a Doctoral Candidate in the Department of Geography at
Southern Illinois University. The authors would like to thank David Brookshire, Bradley
Cullen, and Zachary McCormick for comments on an earlier draft. The opinions expressed
here and any errors are the authors' alone.
"- This material is based on work supported in part by EPA STAR grant (An
Integrated GIS Framework for Water Reallocation and Decision Making in the Upper Rio
Grande), and NSF grant (MMIA 9909140- A Quantitative Assessment of the Economic and
Institutional Impacts of Climate Change on the Upper Rio Grande Valley Using an
Integrated Geographic Information System). Although this article has been funded in part
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency through grant agreement R-82807001-0 to the
University of New Mexico, it has not been subjected to the Agency's required peer and
policy review and therefore does not necessarily reflect the views of the Agency and no
official endorsement should be inferred. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed
in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Science Foundation.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

I. INTRODUCTION
In the western United States, water shortages influence both the
region's economy and environment.1 When shortages occur, conflicts
between competing uses may become bitter and frequently polarize
communities.2 For example, in New Mexico's Middle Rio Grande Valley,
the recent conflict over the silvery minnow was portrayed as either water
3
for cities and farmers or water for the endangered silvery minnow.
When water reallocation choices are defined in terms of "either/or," one
party must win and the other must lose, hence the polarization. Water
conflicts are commonly framed as "either/or" because only a few places
have unallocated surface or ground water available for new uses, and the
potential for obtaining "new" supplies through infrastructure development is limited.4 However, in many instances, the real issue is not
1. See David S. Brookshire et al., Western Urban Water Demand, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J.
873 (2002); Holly Doremus, Water, Population Growth, and Endangered Species in the West, 72
U. COLO. L. REV. 361 (2001); Lora Lucero & A. Dan Tarlock, Water Supply and Urban Growth
in New Mexico: Same Old, Same Old or a New Era?, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 803 (2003); A. Dan
Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western Water Law: From
Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 163 (1999).
2. See Reed D. Benson, Giving Suckers (and Salmon) an Even Break: Klamath Basin Water
and the Endangered Species Act, 15 TUL. ENvTL. L.J. 197 (2002); Holly Doremus & A. Dan
Tarlock, Fish, Farms, and the Clash of Cultures in the Klamath Basin, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 279
(2003); Sean O'Connor, Comment, The Rio Grande Silvery Minnow and the EndangeredSpecies
Act, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 673 (2002).
3. After a federal district court decision reducing water deliveries by the Bureau of
Reclamation, Albuquerque's Mayor Martin Chavez took out a half-page ad in the
Albuquerque Journal with the headline "Someone's Stealing Our Water!" He also said that
Judge Parker's decision ignored "common sense and human need" and that keeping water
in the river for minnows was "a thoughtless and insensitive act." Leslie Linthicum, Mayor's
Ad Enlists Public in Minnow Fight, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 24, 2002, at Al. In his opinion,
Judge Parker clearly places the blame on the federal agencies:
The actions and inactions of the BOR [Bureau of Reclamation] resulted in a
crisis that was then thrust upon this Court a few days ago. This Court had
to make very difficult choices with limited [Endangered Species Act]
options on an emergency basis. The Court believes this crisis situation
could have been avoided if the Federal Defendants, especially the BOR,
had properly performed their statutory duties.
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225-26 (D.N.M. 2002).
4. Many local projects have been proposed in the West. For example, eastern slope
users are continually looking for additional water supplies from Colorado's western slope
and the San Luis Basin. Jerd Smith, Seeking a Water Deal: July Meeting Aims to ProtectRivers,
Providefor Denver, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, June 4, 2005 at A4; Ed Quillen, A Water Baron Takes
on the Establishment,HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Oct. 26, 1998, availableat http://www.hcn.org/
servlets/hcn.Article?articlejid=4560. Although these Colorado examples have not resulted
in water projects, Albuquerque is in the process of constructing a $346,000,000 project that
will divert San Juan Chama water from the Rio Grande and store it underground for later
use. Dan McKay, Water Project Costs up by 29%, ALBUQUERQUE J. Apr. 19, 2005, at Al.
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inadequate supply, but inefficient uses such as failing to conserve water
or using water to produce low value goods.5 If these inefficiencies are the
real problem, then the solution is to encourage conservation and to
6
develop better means of reallocating water to higher value uses.
Focusing efforts on improving efficiency, rather than creating winners
and losers, is a more productive approach to conflicts. Markets 7 and
regulation 8 are two ways for reallocating water. There are advantages
and disadvantages to both methods.9 Markets are the focus of this article.

5. Economists use the term "efficiency" in a very specific way. See, e.g., Charles W.
Howe, ProtectingPublic Values in a Water Market Setting: Improving Water Markets to Increase
Economic Efficiency and Equity, 3 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 357,358 (2000). Because 80 percent
of western water use is related to irrigation, this sector of the economy has the greatest
possibility for making water available for other uses. When this article refers to inefficiency,
irrigated agriculture is to be inferred. An inefficient agricultural use is one that produces a
low value crop instead of a high value one. Flood irrigation or unlined ditches can also be
"inefficient" because other technologies could be used to conserve water, making it
available for other uses. For example, using unlined ditches in the Middle Rio Grande
means only a portion of the water diverted from the river actually reaches a farmer's field.
The maximum efficiency of the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District's (MRGCD)
delivery system between 1976 and 1999 was 36.7 percent with an average for all years of
30.3 percent. S.S. PAPADOPOLOUS & ASSOCs., INC., MIDDLE Rio GRANDE WATER SUPPLY

STUDY tbl.3.6 (2000), http://www.sspa.com/ashu/rio/start.htm (follow "Project Report"
hyperlink, then follow "Tables only" hyperlink).
6. See generally William M. Fleming & G. Emlen Hall, Water Conservation Incentives for
New Mexico: Policy and Legislative Alternatives, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 69 (2000). Oregon has
legislation that allows water right holders to conserve water and then sell up to 75 percent
of that conserved to other users. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.470 (2003). Water users have been
reluctant to participate in that program. See Jesse A. Boyd, Student Writing, Hip Deep: A
Survey of State Instream Flow Law from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific Ocean, 43 NAT.
RESOURCES J.1151,1185-86 (2003).
7. See, e.g., BONNIE COLBY SALIBA & DAVID B. BUSH, WATER MARKETS IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE (1987); RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY
RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION (1989); Victor Brajer et al., The Strengths and
Weaknesses of Water Markets as They Affect Water Scarcity and Sovereign Interests in the West, 29
NAT. RESOURCES J. 489 (1989); Arthur H. Chan, To Market or Not to Market: Allocating Water
Rights in New Mexico, 29 NAT. RESOURCES J. 629 (1989); Ronald C. Griffin & Fred 0. Boadu,
Water Marketing in Texas: Opportunitiesfor Reform, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265 (1992); John D.
Musick, Jr., Reweave the Gordian Knot: Water Futures, Water Marketing, and Western Water
Mythology, 35 ROCKY MTN.MIN. L. INST. 22-1 (1989); Bonnie Colby Saliba, Do Water Markets
"Work"? Market Transfers and Trade-Offs in the Southwestern States, 23 WATER RESOURCES RES.
1113 (1987); Marca Weinberg et al., Water Markets and Water Quality, 75 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON.
278 (1993). For an extensive bibliography on markets and transfers, see Ronald A. Kaiser &
Michael McFarland, A BibliographicPathfinderon Water Marketing, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 881
(1997).
8. One of the best examples of the reallocations of water by regulation is the
Endangered Species Act. Much has been written about this. See articles by Benson, Doremus
& Tarlock, and O'Connor, supra note 2. See also Sandra K. Dunn, Endangered Species Act
Versus Water Resources Development: The California Experience, 25 PAC. L.J. 1107 (1994); A.
Dan Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV.
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In establishing water markets, the areal extent or scale of the
market is sometimes limited. For example, the market could be limited to
a watershed, 10 a state," or a smaller political subdivision such as a
county 1 2 or irrigation district. 13 These spatial limitations impose artificial
boundaries on the potential market. If market reallocation is only
allowed within a limited area, the market is arbitrarily constrained and
desired water use efficiencies may not be obtained. Limitations on the
market area are sometimes imposed for policy reasons such as protecting
a local economy 14 or ensuring that the tax base supporting the water
1 (1985); Melissa K. Estes, Comment, The Effect of the Federal Endangered Species Act on State
Water Rights, 22 ENVrL. L. 1027 (1992); Michael A. Yuffee, Note, Prior Appropriations Water
Rights: Does Lucas Provide a Takings Action Against Federal Regulation Under the Endangered
Species Act?, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1217 (1993).
9. See generally Chan, supra note 7; Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting
Names Right: The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 317
(2000); Harrison C. Dunning, Reflections on the Transfer of Water Rights, 4 J. CONTEMP. L. 109
(1977); Eric T. Freyfogle, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENVTL. L. 27 (1996); Eric T.
Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 154345 (1989); Howe, supra note 5; Olen Paul Matthews, Fundamental Questions about Water
Rights and Market Reallocation,40 WATER RESOURCES RES., Aug. 2004, at W09S08; Olen Paul
Matthews, Simplifying Western Water Rights to Facilitate Water Marketing, 126 WATER
RESOURCES UPDATE 40 (2003); Olen Paul Matthews et al., Marketing Western Water: Can a
Process Based Geographic Information System Improve Reallocation Decisions, 41 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 329 (2001); Zackary L. McCormick, Institutional Barriers to Water Marketing in
the West, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 953 (1994).

10. Watersheds are not generally considered a limiting factor in the West but there are
exceptions. CAL. WATER CODE § 11460 (West 1992). Watershed limitations are more
common in the East. See generally Robert Haskell Abrams, Interbasin Transfer in a Riparian
Jurisdiction,24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 591 (1983); Charles E. Hill, Limitation on Diversionfrom
the Watershed: RiparianRoadblock to Beneficial Use, 23 S.C. L. REV. 43 (1971). The Regulated
Riparian Model Water Code requires consideration be given to sustainable development in
the basin prior to out of basin transfers. AM. Soc'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, THE REGULATED
RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE: FINAL REPORT OF THE WATER LAWS COMMITTEE OF THE
WATER RESOURCES PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT DIVISION OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF

CIVIL ENGINEERS § 6R-3-06, at 250 (Joseph Dellapenna ed., 1997).
11. But see Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (Nebraska statute
limiting exports found unconstitutional).
12. CAL. WATER CODE § 10505 (West 1992). See generally Robirda Lyon, Comment: The
County of Origin Doctrine: Insufficient as a Legal Water Right in California, 12 SAN JOAQUIN
AGRIC. L. REV. 133 (2002).
13. Under state law, a local irrigation district may have to grant permission before a
transfer outside the district is made. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-172(A)(5) (2003);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-108 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 541.333 (2003). There may also be
restrictions under the Reclamation Act. See Bruce Driver, The Effect of Reclamation Law on
Voluntary Water Transfers, 33 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 26-1 (1988); Richard Roos-Collins,
Voluntary Conveyance of the Right to Receive a Water Supply from the United States Bureau of
Reclamation, 13 ECOLOGY L.Q. 773 (1987).
14. Owens Valley is the classic example. See MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE
AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER 54-107 (rev. ed., Penguin Books 1993)
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delivery infrastructure is not eroded. 15 This protectionist tendency is
6
frequently seen in state water policy through a variety of limitations.'
Although most western states have water markets, 17 marketing
water across state boundaries is generally resisted. 18 In fact, until 1982,
many western states had statutes limiting or prohibiting water
exportation.' 9 In 1982, one of these anti-export statutes was held to be an
(1986). See also Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Charles W. Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in
TransbasinWater Diversions:An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 527
(1986); Gary D. Weatherford, Legal Aspects of InterregionalWater Diversion, 15 UCLA L. REV.
1299 (1968); Kenneth R. Weber, Effects of Water Transfers on Rural Areas: A Response to Shupe,
Weatherford, and Checchio, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 13 (1990).
15. If the transfer is from a Reclamation Act project, approval of the Bureau of
Reclamation is required. Approval is based partly on whether an irrigation district's
repayment obligations will be impacted. See Driver, supra note 13, at 26-14; Roos-Collins,
supra note 13, at 849; Joseph L. Sax, Selling Reclamation Water Rights: A Case Study in Federal
Subsidy Policy, 64 MICH. L. REV. 13, 36-40 (1965).
16. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.035, 46.15.037, 46.15.133 (2006) (fees); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-431 (1996) (payment in lieu of property taxes); CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10505 (West 1992)
(county not deprived of water needed for local development), 11460 (West 1992)
(watershed and vicinity limitation); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-45-118 (West 2004 & Supp.
2006) (compensatory storage); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-202A(3) (2003), 42-202B(3) (Supp.
2006) (local public interest), 42-226 (legislative approval required); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a1502 (Supp. 2005) (local public interest, balancing test); MONT.CODE ANN. § 85-2-301 (2005)
(only the state can appropriate water for export); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233.01 (2004), 46613.01 (2004) (factors to be considered in inter-basin transfers); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 533.438 (LexisNexis 2006) (county of origin may impose fees), 533.4385 (LexisNexis 2006)
(mitigation planning), 533.370(6) (LexisNexis 2006) (list of factors considered in transfers),
533.363 (LexisNexis 2006) (county notification); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-29 (1978) (local
public interest), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 105.2 (West 1990), 105.12(A), (B) (West Supp.
2007) (preference given to in-basin use when an application is made for out-of-basin use);
OR. REV. STAT. § 537.803 (2003) (local public interest, list of concerns to address); TEX.
WATER CODE ANN. § 11.085 (Vernon Supp. 2006) (balancing test and list of requirements,
50-year test); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-104(a)(i) (1999) (economic loss to local community).
17. See Charles W. Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential
for Water Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RES. 439, 443 (1986); James L. Huffman, Water
Marketing in Western PriorAppropriation States: A Model for the East, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 429
(2004); Kaiser & McFarland, supra note 7.
18. An exception to resistance to transboundary water transfers is the Arizona Water
Bank. 43 C.F.R. § 414.1 (2005) ("Offstream Storage of Colorado River Water and Development and Release of Intentionally Created Unused Apportionment in the Lower Division
States"). See Margaret Bushman LaBianca, Note, The Arizona Water Bank and the Law of the
River, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 659 (1998); Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 1, at 170 n.45 ("A
proposed Department of Interior permissive rule for the lower Colorado River would allow
states to deposit unused increments of their Compact entitlements into state-authorized
water banks and subsequently transfer the water to a 'consuming' state.").
19. Edward B. Schwartz, Student Article, Water as an Article of Commerce: State
Embargoes Spring a Leak under Sporhase v. Nebraska, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.L. REV. 103, 106 &
n.20 (1985) (citing the following statutes: ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-153B (1956); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-81-101 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-408 (1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
82a-726 (1977); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 85-1-121 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233.01, 46-
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unconstitutional burden on commerce by the U.S. Supreme Court.20 In
spite of the Court's decision, many states continue to feel that water
within their boundaries is theirs exclusively, and should only be used to
benefit their citizens, not the citizens of the entire United States. 21 This
form of economic protectionism is not what was envisioned in the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. The policy choice made by the
Framers of the Constitution was to create an economic union that
included all states and all citizens. State attempts at economic
protectionism through mechanisms such as export bans are generally
unconstitutional unless they can pass one of the limited exceptions to the
Commerce Clause. One potential exception is through the use of
interstate compacts. 22 As a result, Commerce Clause analysis forms the
foundation for any evaluation of restrictions on marketing water across
state boundaries. The question examined here is: To what extent do
interstate water compacts act as a constraint on water marketing?23
Many states look upon a compact as a permanent allocation of
water between states that cannot be changed. 24 However, this viewpoint
is overly restrictive and constrains markets unnecessarily. An allocation
contained within an interstate compact should be looked upon as an
initial allocation of water, not a permanent one. In this article we
613.01 (1978); NEV. REv. STAT § 533.520 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1979); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1085.2.2 (West Supp. 1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 (1979); S.D. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 46-1-13 (Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-8 (Supp. 1979); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.300,90.16.110,90.16.120 (1962); WYO. STAT. § 41-3-105 (1977)).
20. Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
21. Subsequent to the Sporhase decision, many states passed additional legislation that
attempts to conform to the constitutional limitations but still may inhibit the free
movement of water across state boundaries. See infra notes 261-289 and accompanying text.
22. Interstate compacts become federal law on congressional acceptance creating the
exception. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293 (D.
Mont. 1983), affd, 769 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1985).
23. Douglas L. Grant raised this question and suggests that there may be doubts as to
whether compacts limit exports: "[D]oes congressional consent to a compact allocating a
certain volume of water to a signatory state mean that the state can bar the interstate export
of this water free of the commerce clause? The Sporhase statement about the effect of
congressional consent to compacts.. .seems to cast doubt on this possibility." Douglas L.
Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §
48.03(c)(6), at 48-44 (Robert E. Beck ed., repl. vol. 2004) [hereinafter Grant, State Regulation of
Interstate Water Export].
24. For a general discussion of whether the compacts themselves are permanent, see
Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue ofPermanence Becomes
the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 105 (2003) [hereinafter Grant, Compacts], and Jill
Elaine Hasday, Student Article, Interstate Compacts in a Democratic Society: The Problem of
Permanency, 49 FLA. L. REV. 1 (1997). See also Zachary L. McCormick, The Use of Interstate
Compacts to Resolve Transboundary Water Allocation Issues (May 1994) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University) (on file with author).
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examine the Rio Grande Compact in detail and interstate compacts in
general to determine whether compacts place limits on water markets
between states. We conclude that compacts may constitutionally limit
markets, but most do not do so. This policy is sound, because it benefits
all U.S. citizens by allowing our economic free trade zone to function as
envisioned in the Constitution. Reducing the size of a market area by
limiting water exports constrains the ability to move water from
inefficient uses to more efficient ones. If the goal is to reduce water
conflicts, then state boundaries need to be erased when developing water
markets. 25 The Commerce Clause provides the mechanism for doing this.
Our article looks first at water supply and demand in the Upper
Rio Grande. We then evaluate the Commerce Clause and its exceptions.
Because interstate compacts can provide an exception to the free trade
requirements of the Commerce Clause, compacts in the West will be
examined, with special attention given the Rio Grande Compact. State
water laws relevant to marketing water are also examined to see what
can survive Commerce Clause scrutiny. Special attention is paid to
Colorado's and New Mexico's water laws. After analyzing the situation,
we conclude that compacts need very specific language in order to limit
exports and that specific language is missing from the Rio Grande
Compact.
11. WATER IN THE UPPER RIO GRANDE VALLEY
The Upper Rio Grande Valley, 26 from Elephant Butte Reservoir
upstream to the headwaters of the Rio Grande, is a microcosm of the
problems facing western states. The region has pressures to convert
25. Australia is able to market water across state boundaries without creating rancor
among its states. The Murray-Darling Basin Commission and the Murray-Darling Basin
Ministerial Commission manage transboundary problems within the Murray-Darling
basin. In 1997 a cap on water diversions was set for each basin state. This in essence fixed
the allocation of water among the states. See DARLA HATTON MACDONALD & MIKE YOUNG,
A CASE STUDY OF THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN (rev. Feb. 2001), available at http://
www.clw.csiro.au/publications/consultancy/2001/MDB-IWMI.pdf; Henning Bjomlund &
Jennifer McKay, Australian Water Market Policies: Current Issues and Future Directions, 28
WATER 74, 75-78 (Mar. 2001). In spite of this allocation or perhaps because of it, trading in
water between states started in 1998. See MIKE YOUNG ET AL., INTER-srATE WATER TRADING:
A Two YEAR REVIEW (2000) available at http://www.clw.csiro.au/publications/

consultancy/2000/intertrading.pdf.
26. This area includes the entire basin from Elephant Butte Reservoir to the
headwaters in Colorado. Although much of what is said in this article also applies to areas
downstream from Elephant Butte Reservoir, our focus here is more limited. The Upper Rio
Grande consists of three regions for our purposes: the Middle Rio Grande from Elephant
Butte reservoir to Cochiti reservoir, the area from Cochiti reservoir to the Colorado state
line, and the portion of the basin in Colorado.
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agricultural water use to urban uses, upstream and downstream
allocation problems across state boundaries, conflicts between federal
and state interests, inefficient uses, un-quantified water rights, and other
common western issues. Many of these problems are rooted in historic
approaches to water management and no longer reflect societal
preferences. The institutional structure for water management in the
Upper Rio Grande is slowly addressing these problems as are
27
institutions in the rest of the West.
The Rio Grande originates in Colorado's high mountains and
28
then flows into the San Luis Valley where it is used for irrigation.
Subsequently, the river flows into New Mexico where historically it
supported many traditional communities found along the Rio Grande
and its tributaries. 29 Early conflicts between New Mexico and Colorado
centered on allocating water between the two states to accommodate
increases in agricultural water use, drought, and an embargo on the use
of federal lands for new agricultural water diversions. 30 The situation
today is very different, with urban and environmental needs taking a
27. For a discussion of the recent issues in the Middle Rio Grande, see John R. Brown,
"Whisky's fer Drinkin',Water'sfer Fightin'!" Is It? Resolving a CollectiveAction Dilemma in New
Mexico, 43 NAT. RESOURCES J. 185 (2003); Lisa D. Brown, The Middle Rio Grande Conservancy
District's ProtectedWater Rights: Legal, Beneficial, or Against the Public Interest in New Mexico?,
40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Brown, Protected Water Rights]; Denise D. Fort,
Restoring the Rio Grande: A Case Study in Environmental Federalism, 28 ENVTL. L. 15 (1998);
Lucero & Tarlock, supra note 1; Ethan R. Hasenstein, Note, Frankenstein and Pitbull?
Transmogrifying the Endangered Species Act and "Fixing" the San Juan-Chama Project after Rio
Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 34 ENvTL. L. 1247 (2004), Celina A. Jones, Student Writing,
The Administration of the Middle Rio Grande Basin: 1956-2002, 42 NAT. RESOURCES J. 939
(2002); O'Connor, supra note 2; Beth Richards, Case Note, The Pump Don't Work Because the
Bureau Took the Handle: The United States Bureau of Reclamation's Discretion to Reduce Water
Deliveries to Comply with the EndangeredSpecies Act. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333
F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), 4 WYo. L. REv. 113 (2004).
28. By 1894, 400,000 acres were under irrigation and in 1997 over 600,000 acres. See
William A. Paddock, The Rio Grande Compact of 1938, 5 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2001)
[hereinafter Paddock, Rio Grande Compact]. See generally Steven E. Vandiver, The
Administration of the Rio Grande Compact in Colorado (presentation at the 44th Annual
N.M. Water Conf., Dec. 2, 1999) (on file with author) (Vandiver's paper is an excellent
summary on how the compact is administered in Colorado.).
29. See, e.g., ALVAR W. CARLSON, THE SPANISH-AMERICAN HOMELAND: FOUR
CENTURIES IN NEW MEXICO'S Rio ARRIBA (1990); Jost A. RIVERA, ACEQUIA CULTURE: WATER,
LAND, AND COMMUNITY IN THE SOUTHWEST (1998); Jos6 A. Rivera, Irrigation Communities of
the Upper Rio Grande Bioregion: Sustainable Resource Use in the Global Context, 36 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 491 (1996) [hereinafter Rivera, IrrigationCommunities]; Christopher J. DeLara,
Student Writing, Who Controls New Mexico's Acequias? Acequia Government and Wilson v.
Denver, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J.727 (2000).
30. See Paddock, Rio Grande Compact, supra note 28. By 1904, all streams entering the
basin in Colorado were appropriated with over 600,000 acres being irrigated by 1929.
McCormick, supra note 24, at 92-93.
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more central role. The growth of urban centers in New Mexico and the
classification of the silvery minnow as an endangered species has
increased pressure on this limited resource, making water shortages
during dry years a common occurrence. 31 Although about 80 to 90
percent of all water in the Upper Rio Grande is diverted for agricultural
uses,32 future demands are in the urban and environmental sectors. The
pressure for converting agricultural uses to urban uses falls mostly on
surface waters, because agricultural consumption in this area comes
mostly from surface supplies. In addition, ground water and surface
water are conjunctively managed in the Middle Rio Grande with new
permits for ground water being denied unless surface water rights are
retired. 33 As in other places in the West, reallocating water from
agricultural to urban uses is an ongoing challenge, especially when
endangered species are thrown into the mix. 34 The challenge exists in the
Upper Rio Grande because inefficient uses are protected by the current
property rights regime, and because very little New Mexico water is
available for reallocation through market processes. 35

31.

See O'Connor, supra note 2, at 677. See also Lucero & Tarlock, supra note 1.

32.

ERNIE NEMI & THOMAS McGUKIN, WATER MANAGEMENT STUDY: UPPER RIO

GRANDE BASIN. REPORT TO WESTERN WATER POLICY REVIEW ADVISORY COMMISSION (1997).
A high percentage of agricultural use is common in all the western states. See WAYNE B.
SOLLEY, ESTIMATES OF WATER USE IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES IN 1990 AND WATER-USE

TRENDS 1960-1990 (Rep. to the W. Water Pol'y Rev. Advisory Comm.) 2-3, 5, 7-8 (1997).
33. City of Albuquerque v. Reynolds, 379 P.2d 73 (1962). See Charles T. DuMars,
Changing Interpretationsof New Mexico's Constitutional Provisions Allocating Water Resources:
Integrating PrivateProperty Rights and Public Values, 26 N.M. L. REV. 367 (1996); Jones, supra
note 27.
34. See Benson, supra note 2; Doremus, supra note 1; Doremus & Tarlock, supra note 2;
Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities: The Searchfor
Smarter Approaches, 2 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 27 (1994); Michael R. Moore et
al., Water Allocation in the American West: Endangered Fish Versus IrrigatedAgriculture, 36
NAT. RESOURCES J. 319 (1996); Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 1; Megan Hennessy,
Comment: Colorado River Water Rights: Property Rights in Transition,71 U. Cm-. L. REv. 1661
(2004); Ryan Waterman, Comment, Addressing California's Uncertain Water Future by
CoordinatingLong-Term Land Use and Water Planning: Is a Water Element in the General Plan
the Next Step?, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 117 (2004).
35. Many water rights are owned in perpetuity such as those of Albuquerque and
other municipalities. When these rights and other water rights incapable of passing the
tests for validity are taken off the table, there are only 50,000 to 60,000 acre-feet left that
could be traded. David S. Brookshire et al., Are There Any Water Rights Left to Trade in the
Middle Rio Grande? (poster presented at N.M. Water Resource Res. Inst. Ann. Conf., 2002),
available at http://www.unm.edu/-brookshi/posters/waterlefttotrade.pdf. With little
water to trade, shortages will have to be met with water from outside the area. Warnings
about water shortages in New Mexico are not new. Brian McDonald & John Tysseling,
Water Availability in the New Mexico Upper Rio Grande Basin to the Year 2000, 22 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 855 (1982).
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The property rights system developed under the prior
appropriation doctrine was designed to protect investments by
establishing a preference system based on priority of use. 36 The first
rights developed have a priority over subsequently established rights. As
the system has evolved, inefficient uses have been protected. 37 Inefficient
uses include traditional practices such as unlined ditches or uses with a
low or negative rate of economic return such as alfalfa or irrigated
pastures. 38 The property rights system protects these practices because
the standard for establishing a right is not based on whether the use is
"efficient," but on whether the use is "beneficial." 39 Although "wasteful"
practices are prohibited, waste is defined by historic concepts, not
current best management practices. As a result, water can be used to
irrigate a pasture because that use is considered beneficial even if it is not
very profitable. Inefficient uses can, however, be converted to more
efficient uses through a market. Irrigators have water rights that are a
property right with the same constitutional protections given property
rights in land. 40 As a result, the right can be sold even though such sales
are not always simple.41 Significant problems exist for establishing
markets in water, but success has occurred in some smaller regions.42 For
example, a water bank has been established in central New Mexico. 43
However, demands in Albuquerque, Santa Fe, and Rio Rancho cannot be
completely satisfied by purchasing water from local sources because not
much water is actually available. 44

36. See Robert E. Beck et al., Elements of PriorAppropriation,in 2 WATERS AND WATER
RIGI-rS § 12 (Robert E. Beck ed., repl. vol. 2001 & Supp. 2005).
37. See Fleming & Hall, supra note 6; Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and
Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998);
Steven Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprintfor Change, 61 OR. L. REV. 483 (1982).
38. NIEMI & MCGUKIN, supra note 32, at 58 (stating that in 1993 pasture in the Middle
Rio Grande when supplied with three acre-feet of water per acre produced net earnings of
a negative $80 per acre).
39. See Neuman, supranote 37, at 933.
40. Wyatt v. Larimer & Weld Irrigation Co., 29 P. 906, 910 (Colo. Ct. App. 1892), rev'd
on other grounds, 33 P. 144 (1893) ("[lIt is.. .the property of the appropriator in every legal
aspect."). See sources cited infra note 228.
41. See George A. Gould, Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 1 (1988); Frank Trelease, Changes and Transfers of Water Rights, 13 ROcKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 507 (1967); Michael D. White, Problems Under State Water Laws: Changes
in Existing Water Rights, 8 NAT. REsoURcES LAW. 359 (1975).
42. See Howe et al., supra note 17.
43. See N.M. ADMIN. CODE § 21.7.5 (1995); Subas Shah, The Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District: Sustaining the Middle Valley for over 70 Years, in WATER GROWTH AND
SUSTAINABILITY: PLANNING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 4 (45th Ann. N.M. Water Conf. Proc.,

2000), availableat http://wrri.nmsu.edu/pubish/watcon/proc45/contents.htm.
44. See Brookshire et al., supra note 35.
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The situation facing Albuquerque and the other urbanizing areas
in New Mexico is not unique. 45 These urban interests are willing to buy,
but few sellers can be found. The situation in Albuquerque will illustrate
the problem. Albuquerque has traditionally taken its water from a large
aquifer underlying the city. The size of the aquifer was grossly over
estimated, and studies have shown that the level of use that occurred in
the 1990s could not be sustained.46 As a result, Albuquerque is
developing a project to use water allocated to it from the Rio Grande
under the San Juan Chama Project.47 Current uses of the river consume
its entire surface flow in dry years. When Albuquerque begins to use
surface water, more pressure will be created on the limited resource. In
addition to using its San Juan Chama waters, Albuquerque has been
buying available surface or groundwater rights.48 Although some sales
have been made, very few are currently occurring.
Competing for water in the area are agricultural interests and the
in-stream needs of the endangered silvery minnow. The Middle Rio
Grande Conservancy District represents many of the agricultural
interests in the area because it delivers water to the area's farmers. The
district claims rights to deliver water to individuals who have vested
rights to irrigate 80,785 acres of land and claims rights on its own to
irrigate 42,482 acres of land.49 These claims have not been adjudicated
and are not scheduled to be in the near future. In addition, the
conservancy district's water may be limited to use within the district's
boundaries.50 The conservancy district has a standing offer to buy water
and does not appear to be willing at this time to sell any rights. In
45. See Tarlock & Van de Wetering, supra note 1;MacDonnell & Rice, supranote 34.
46. See generally John Michael Kernodle, Simulation of Ground-water flow in the
Albuquerque Basin, 1901-1995, Central New Mexico, with Projections to 2020 (U.S. Geological
Surv. Open-File Rep. 96-209, 1998); J.M. Kernodle et al., Simulation of Ground-water Flow in
the Albuquerque Basin, 1901-1995, Central New Mexico, with Projections to 2020 (U.S.
Geological Surv. Water-Resources Investigations Rep. 94-4251, 1995).
47. See McKay, supra note 4.
48. The price the City of Albuquerque is willing to pay is going up. When the study
was done on available supply in the area, Brookshire et al., supra note 35, the standard offer
by the city was $3,900. In 2004, the city was paying $4,500 to $5,000 per acre-foot. Prices for
2005 were $6,000 to $7,000 per acre-foot. Telephone Interview with Andrew Lieuwen,
Water Resources, City of Albuquerque (Oct. 10, 2005).
49. Shah, supra note 43, at 3. Actual irrigation in the district has been declining and is
now less than 60,000 acres, but in spite of the decline in acres irrigated, the amount
diverted has increased. See Brown, Protected Water Rights, supra note 27, at 13; NIEMI &
McGUKiN, supranote 32, at 86.
50. "The Reclamation Act makes no specific reference to reallocation of project rights,"
Amy K. Kelly, Federal Reclamation Law, in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 41.06(a), at 41-78
(Robert E. Beck ed., repl. vol. 2004). Commentators generally feel reallocation is allowable,
but the circumstances are not always clear. See sources cited supranote 15.
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addition to agricultural needs, the federal rights associated with the
silvery minnow have been in litigation, and somehow the minnow must
be accommodated. 5' Under drought conditions all these water needs
cannot be met.
Upstream from Albuquerque and the Middle Rio Grande
Conservancy District are other water users, but again surplus water may
not be available for sale to Albuquerque. Water from acequia
communities in northern New Mexico is limited in volume and may
have significant institutional constraints against sale.52 Santa Fe and Rio
Rancho are also looking upstream for potential sources of water. In
situations like this, the area in which trade takes place needs to be
expanded well beyond the local area in order for a market to function.
One solution is to expand the boundaries of the market to
include water in another state. 53 Upstream on the Rio Grande is
Colorado's San Luis Valley. In an average year, 975,000 acre-feet of water
from the Rio Grande flows into the valley and 650,000 acre-feet are
consumed. 54 About 600,000 acres of land are irrigated,5 5 with the
principal crops being barley, potatoes, alfalfa, and some winter wheat.
The water rights in the San Luis Valley have all been adjudicated. As a
result of these factors, water could be available in the San Luis Valley,
but political resistance to sales outside the valley is strong. Although
sales across the state boundary may be rational to the state receiving the
water, the perspective from the other side is quite different.5 6 The
51. Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1225-26 (D.N.M. 2002),
affd, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003), vacated, 355 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2004).
52. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-24.1, 73-2-21 (Supp. 2006) (giving acequia commissioners
the power to deny transfers if they are "detrimental to the acequia, community ditch or its
members"). See also Rivera, Irrigation Communities, supra note 29. For public interest
considerations, see In re Application of Sleeper, 760 P.2d 787 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (finding
that the statute requiring consideration of "public welfare" did not apply at the time of the
disputed water transfer) (referring to 1985 amendment to N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23,
enacted after the transfer).
53. El Paso, Texas, can make the same arguments used in this article about water in
New Mexico.
54. NiEMI & McGuXiN, supranote 32, at 4.
55. Paddock, Rio Grande Compact, supra note 28, at 5. In comparison, the Middle Rio
Grande has a maximum of 400,000 acre-feet available for consumption from the river when
there is at least 1.5 million acre-feet in the Rio Grande at Otowi gage. Additions to the river
below Otowi gage allow for total consumption of about 600,000 acre-feet. Consumption
includes agricultural, municipal, riparian, and reservoir evaporation. If there is less than 1.5
million acre-feet at Otowi gage, then consumptive amounts in the Middle Rio Grande must
be reduced in order to deliver sufficient water to Elephant Butte to meet compact
obligations. PAPADOPOLOUS, supra note 5,tbls. ES-2, ES-3.
56. See, e.g., Christi Davis & Douglas M. Branson, Interstate Compacts in Commerce and
Industry: A Proposalfor Common Markets Among States, 23 VT. L. REV. 133 (1998). Moving
water out of a basin but within a state can also be problematic. Quillen, supra note 4.
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question is whether a state can legally restrict water marketing to the
area within its own boundaries. The answer lies partly in the Commerce
57
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
III. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
The Articles of Confederation, which preceded the U.S.
Constitution, defined the relationships between the states and between
the states and the federal government. The Articles of Confederation
allowed states to enact protectionist tariffs, taxes, and duties, which
resulted in limiting the movement of goods and services.58 The result
was economic chaos. One reason the constitutional convention was
called was to rectify this problem, and the Commerce Clause was the
mechanism for doing so. 5 9 On its face, the Clause gives the federal
government power over commerce, which was confirmed by early
interpretations related to navigation.6 0 Over the years, judicial
interpretation of the Clause has expanded federal power over natural
resources with few limitations. 61 The Supreme Court also has interpreted
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
58. See Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: "Neither a national or a Federal
Constitution, but a Composition of Both," 86 YALE L. J. 1273 (1977); Olen Paul Matthews, The
Supreme Court, the Commerce Clause,and Natural Resources, 12 ENVTL. MGMT. 413 (1988).
59. Matthews, supranote 58, at 413.
60. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
557 (1871).
61. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (finding that a privately
owned pond dredged to connect to the Pacific and serve as a marina became subject to
federal regulation as navigable waters under the Commerce Clause); United States v.
Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960) (finding no compensable state interest when
the federal government exercised Commerce Clause authority to condemn state land for a
flood control project); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956) (holding
that a private power company was not entitled to Fifth Amendment taking compensation
for value created by a federal power project when that value derived from proper
congressional exercise of Commerce Clause authority); United States v. Appalachian Elec.
Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (finding that a river is navigable and thus subject to federal
control if potential improvements make it navigable in fact and even if actual navigable use
is infrequent or absent); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690
(1899) (finding federal jurisdiction to regulate nonnavigable tributaries to or reaches of
streams that are navigable downstream). A few recent cases have, however, restricted
congressional power. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding that the Clean Water Act did not allow the Corps of
Engineers to define intrastate waters used by migratory birds as navigable waters). For
non-natural resource cases, see also United States v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598 (2000) and United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Violence Against Women Act and the
Gun-Free School Zones Act, respectively, were insufficiently related to interstate commerce
to be a valid exercise of Commerce Clause authority). The link between the Commerce
Clause and natural resources has generated considerable discussion. See, e.g., Jonathan H.
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the Clause to prevent states from passing statutes that will interfere with
commerce. This judicial interpretation is generally referred to as the
negative or dormant Commerce Clause. 62 Discriminatory state statutes
that put a burden on commerce will only be allowed under limited
circumstances. The intent of the Commerce Clause was to create one
economic unit where goods and services could be freely moved and
traded. Banning imports and exports, taxing goods from outside the
state differently, and charging higher fees to out-of-state businesses all
63
discriminate and harm the common market the Constitution created.
Barriers are prohibited except where needed to protect local interests in
health and safety such as with quarantines. 64 Other exceptions include
congressional consent to placing a burden on commerce 65 and instances

Adler, JudicialFederalism and the Futureof FederalEnvironmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV.
377 (2005); Monica Berry, Liquefied Natural Gas Import Terminals: Jurisdiction over Siting,
Construction, and Operation in the Context of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,26 ENERGY L.J.
135 (2005); George C. Coggins, Grizzly Bears Don't Stop at Customs: A Preface to
Transboundary Problems in Natural Resources Law, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 1 (1983); James H.
Goetz, Federalism and Natural Resources: Prologue, 43 MONT. L. REV. 155 (1982); James
Huffman, Governing America's Resources: Federalism in the 1980's, 12 ENVTL. L. 863 (1982);
Christine A. Klein, The Environmental Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV. 1 (2003);
P,C. McGinley, Federalism Lives! Reflections on the Vitality of the Federal System in the Context
of Natural Resource Regulation, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 147 (1983); Paula C. Murray & David B.
Spence, FairWeather Federalismand America's Waste Disposal Crisis, 27 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV.
71 (2003); A. Dan Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the
1980's: Scaling America'sMagic Mountain, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 111 (1983).
62. For discussion of the negative Commerce Clause, see, for example, Natasha Ernst,
Flow Control Ordinances in a Post-Carbone World, 13 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 53 (2004); Julian
N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Michael A.
Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework,
21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 395 (1998); Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant
Commerce Clause and the ConstitutionalBalance of Federalism,1987 DUKE L.J. 569; Donald H.
Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986); Shelley Ross Saxer, Eminent Domain, Municipalization,
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1505 (2005); Douglas R. Williams,
Trash, Trains, Trucks, Taxes -And Theory, 49 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 835 (2005).
63. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); Or. Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill,
Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc. v.
Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992); Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982);
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617
(1978); Hunt v. Wash. St. Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); West v. Kan. Natural
Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
64. Maine. v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986); Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908); Reid v.
Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902).
65. New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331,339-40 (1982).
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where there is sufficient "state interest" to overcome the constitutional
66
prohibitions.
Commerce Clause analysis in the Supreme Court generally
centers on several questions. The first question provides the foundation
for subsequent analysis. Is the item, in this case water, an article of
commerce? Is state regulation evenhanded or does it discriminate? Is
there a legitimate local interest without any nondiscriminatory
alternatives? Has Congress created an exception by giving permission to
place an otherwise impermissible burden on commerce? Is there a state
interest exception? Within any single controversy these questions are
often overlapping. All are relevant for understanding water marketing
across state boundaries.
A. Is Water an Article of Commerce?
For many years western states operated under the premise that
water was the property of the state and therefore fell under a state
interest exception to the Commerce Clause.67 Several historic court
decisions related to water and wildlife seemed to uphold this concept. In
Geer v. Connecticut s the Supreme Court upheld a ban on the export of
wildlife, and in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter,69 a water export
ban was upheld. Although state ownership was barely mentioned in
Hudson County, the state ownership concept became ingrained in state
policy with states passing statutes banning exports of water based on
this presumed ownership. 70 State ownership was first called into
question in the City of Altus v. Carr.71 In this case, Altus, Oklahoma, had a
contract with a Texas landowner and intended to pump ground water
for city use. Texas passed a statute prohibiting water export. In Texas,
ground water once withdrawn from the ground was considered personal
property. Based on the idea that water was personal property, a threejudge federal district court had little difficulty deciding that, in Texas, at
66. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809, 811 (1976). See also Dan T.
Coenen, Untangling the Market-ParticipantExemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88
MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989).
67. The state interest exception sets the framework for the Supreme Court's decisions.
For the current scope of the exception, see infra notes 117-126 and accompanying text.
68. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
69. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
70. Some western state constitutions have provisions stating that water is the property
of the state or is held in trust by the people of the state. See, e.g., IDAHO CONST. art. 15, § 1
(use of water is a "public use"); MONT. CoNsT. art. IX, § 3(3) (water is the "property of the
state"); N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (water belongs "to the public"); WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
(water is the "property of the state").
71. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966); affd, 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
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least, ground water was an article of commerce. The ban on exports was
prohibited. This case did not get to the question of whether states that
claimed water ownership would be similarly barred. The Supreme Court
decided that issue in Sporhase v. Nebraska.72
In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Nebraska export
ban was unconstitutional. Nebraska argued that its ownership interest in
ground water was much stronger than a state's interest in wildlife and
stronger than the ownership interest Texas had in ground water. The
Supreme Court, however, said that, although Nebraska's claim of a
greater ownership interest in ground water had some merit, it did not
remove ground water from Commerce Clause scrutiny. The Court said
that state ownership claims are based on a legal fiction. 73 Nebraska also
argued that its state interest was stronger with water than with other
natural resources because water was necessary for human survival. 74
Although the court conceded that Nebraska had a strong interest in
water, they went on to conclude that water was an article of commerce:
Although water is indeed essential for human survival,
studies indicate that over 80% of our water supplies is used
for agricultural purposes. The agricultural markets
supplied by irrigated farms are worldwide. They provide
the archtypical example of commerce among the several
States for which the Framers of our Constitution intended
to authorize federal regulation. 75
Clearly the Court held that water was an article of commerce and subject
to the dormant Commerce Clause.
In two subsequent federal district court decisions, New Mexico's
statutes controlling out-of-state water use were challenged. In the first,
an export ban was found unconstitutional. 76 After this, New Mexico
revised its laws based on the Sporhase decision. El Paso challenged New
Mexico's revised statutes, but the same district court upheld them.77 State
statutes controlling out-of-state transfers will be examined in more detail
below. 78
72. 458 U.S. 941 (1982). The Court also rejected the idea of state ownership of wildlife
as a defense to a commerce clause challenge to a state ban on transportation of fish for sale
outside the state. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
73. Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982).
74. Id. at 952.
75. Id. at 953 (citation omitted).
76. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso ), 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983), affd on reh'g,
597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
77. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso II), 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
78. See infra notes 248-277 and accompanying text.
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As an article of commerce, water is subject to federal regulation,
but states can also regulate water, including the way in which out-ofstate transfers occur. In order for state statutes to pass Commerce Clause
scrutiny, they must pass a two-part test.79 First, state statutes must be
evenhanded and applied without discrimination. Second, state statutes
must be designed to accomplish a legitimate local purpose. 8° This twopart test will be discussed in the next two sections.
B. Is State Regulation Evenhanded or Does It Discriminate?
States are free to regulate articles of commerce as long as federal
law has not preempted state law, 81 but states cannot regulate articles of
commerce in ways that interfere with the economic free trade zone the
Commerce Clause was designed to protect. 82 A common way states have
come into conflict with the dormant Commerce Clause is through state
statutes that ban exports and imports. 83 The Supreme Court has not been
very sympathetic to state attempts to ban the free movement of goods,
because such statutes discriminate against those from out of state. This
form of discrimination is called "facial discrimination" because the
language of the statute specifically excludes imports or exports. Other
statutes that are facially discriminatory are tax-related with states taxing
84
out-of-state goods and services differently than those inside the state.
79. This test is for facially discriminatory statutes. For those with discriminatory
impact a balancing test is used. Examples of cases finding facial discrimination can be
found suprain note 63.
80. Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 954 (1982) (citing Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142 (1970)).
81. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (finding no federal
preemption but holding that a state statute barring the importation of solid and liquid
waste unconstitutionally interfered with interstate commerce).
82. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537-38 (1949) ("The
principle that our economic unit is the Nation.. .has as its corollary that the states are not
separable economic units."); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935) ("one
state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic isolation").
83. See, e.g., Sporhase, 458 U.S. 941 (water); City of Philadelphia,437 U.S. 617 (garbage);
Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (natural gas); West v. Kan. Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911) (natural gas). The Court has also struck down laws where states
attempted to exercise jurisdiction beyond their boundaries. Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491
U.S. 324 (1989).
84. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994) (state tax on
personal property purchased outside state created discriminatory burden on interstate
commerce); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997)
(state property tax exemption for charitable institutions impermissibly favored institutions
serving state residents); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232
(1987) (exemptions to tax for manufacturers selling products within the state discriminated
against interstate commerce); Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)
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In these cases the free movement of goods and services is not barred, but
it is made more expensive. State statutes considered facially.discriminatory will be subjected to the strictest scrutiny by the courts. 85 In
addition, state laws that are not facially discriminatory, but have a
discriminatory impact, may also be unconstitutional.86 Because state laws
that facially discriminate are strictly scrutinized by the courts, they are
almost always found invalid.87 Those state laws that are only
discriminatory in their impact are tested by a less strenuous balancing
approach. 5
The Court's long line of decisions makes it quite clear that state
statutes must be evenhanded and nondiscriminatory. Citizens from
(sales tax for the "privilege of.. .doing business" within state did not violate Commerce
Clause). When out-of-state residents or corporations pay a tax that is in some way different
from that of residents or domestic corporations, the state statute is discriminatory. The
discrimination can be overcome if the tax is a compensatory or complementary tax
designed to offset a domestic tax or service. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160
(1999) (franchise tax on foreign corporations was not comparable to taxes on domestic
corporations and thus violated the Commerce Clause); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1994) (state sales tax on interstate bus travel had sufficient nexus to
state to be valid under dormant Commerce Clause); Barclays Bank, PLC v. Franchise Tax
Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (state method for calculating corporate franchise tax allowed
approximations that did not unfairly burden foreign corporations). The person or
corporation being taxed must have a minimal connection or sufficient nexus with the
taxing state to justify the tax. Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 528 U.S. 458,
464 (2000). These cases often have "due process" elements. Even if a nexus exists, taxation
must be on a proportional basis. See Hunt-Wesson, 483 U.S. at 279. Another way states
discriminate through taxation is by charging a higher tax on goods imported from out of
state. Excise taxes on alcohol have been struck down. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v.
Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1990); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
85. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456 (1992) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322 337 (1979)).
86. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
87. An exception is Maine v. Taylor.
As long as a State does not needlessly obstruct interstate trade or attempt
to place itself in a position of economic isolation, it retains broad
regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of its citizens and the
integrity of its natural resources. The evidence in this case amply supports
the District Court's findings that Maine's ban on the importation of live
baitfish serves legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be
served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives. This is not a case of
arbitrary discrimination against interstate commerce; the record suggests
that Maine has legitimate reasons, apart from their origin, to treat [out-ofstate baitfish] differently.
477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (bracketed text

in original).
88. Some state statutes pass this less stringent test. See, e.g., Commonwealth Edison Co.
v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456
(1981); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
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outside the state must be treated the same as citizens from inside the
state. Goods and services from outside the state must also receive the
same treatment as goods and services from inside the state. The
Commerce Clause requires a level playing field in all aspects of
commerce. In spite of the requirement to be evenhanded, states continue
to have a protectionist attitude that places a burden on interstate
commerce. Although exceptions do exist, many state attempts are simply
poorly disguised attempts at economic protectionism. Such economic
protectionism is unconstitutional.
States have tried to get around the evenhanded treatment
required by the Commerce Clause by limiting the transfer of water rights
to other in-state users outside a watershed or by denying transfers to all
users both inside the state and outside. One form of statute limiting the
transfer to other in-state uses is called "basin of origin" statutes. 89 They
are designed to protect the citizens of a basin from situations like the one
in the Owens Valley when Los Angeles de-watered the entire region.
Statutes that deny all transfers are justifiable only if there is a legitimate
local interest with no nondiscriminatory alternatives. This exception will
be discussed in the next section. The question here is whether basin of
origin statutes, and others like them, will pass constitutional muster.
Proponents argue that there is no discrimination because all potential
users outside the boundaries of the watershed are treated alike, both instate and out-of-state interests. However, limiting water transfers to
users within a watershed may not be any more acceptable than
limitations on transfers within a county or some other spatial sub-unit of
the state. A Supreme Court opinion involving a Michigan statute sheds
some light on how the Court would approach this issue.90
Michigan's Solid Waste Management Act contained a provision
prohibiting the disposal of solid waste generated in another county or
state unless the county receiving the waste had a solid waste
management plan that specifically allowed it.91 A landfill in St. Clair
County applied for a permit to accept solid waste from out of state and
was denied permission because the St. Clair County plan did not allow
out-of-county solid waste. The landfill sued, seeking to overturn the
statute as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause.92 The district

89. See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
90. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353
(1992).
91. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 732 F. Supp. 761, 762
(E.D. Mich. 1990), affd, 931 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1991), affid, Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, 504
U.S. 353.
92. Id.
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court dismissed the action, and it was appealed. The appeals court found
the statute nondiscriminatory because the out-of-state waste was treated
the same as waste outside the county but from in-state sources. 93 This
decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, which said,
The Waste Import Restrictions enacted by Michigan
authorize each of the State's 83 counties to isolate itself
from the national economy. Indeed unless the county acts
affirmatively to permit other waste to enter its jurisdiction,
the statute affords local waste producers complete
protection from competition from out-of-state waste
producers who seek to use local waste disposal areas. In
view of the fact that Michigan has not identified any
reason, apart from its origin, why solid waste coming from
outside the county should be treated differently from solid
waste within the county, the foregoing reasoning would
appear to control the disposition of this case.94
Even though Michigan argued strongly that there was no discrimination,
the Court would not allow a county to do something the state would be
prohibited from doing. By analogy, banning the export of water from a
watershed or county would also be unconstitutional. Spatial limitations
on commerce are inherently discriminatory and will fail unless a
legitimate local purpose is found.95
C. Is There a Legitimate Local Purpose Without Any
Nondiscriminatory Alternatives?
Finding a legitimate local purpose without nondiscriminatory
alternatives is difficult, but not impossible. The Supreme Court has
suggested several situations where local interests could prevail even
though in these instances the state failed to do so. 96 The major case where
the court has actually upheld a discriminatory state law is Maine v.

93. Bill Kettlewell Excavating, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 931 F.2d 413, 417 (6th
Cir. 1991).
94. FortGratiot SanitaryLandfill, 504 U.S. at 361.
95. See also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, in which a local ordinance
requiring that a local waste transfer station be used by all residents was found unconstitutional even though all state residents were being treated alike. 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
96. See, e.g., Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342-47 (1992)
(nondiscriminatory "quarantine" measures to protect local health from dangers of
hazardous waste); Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 952-57 (1982) (local
interest in conserving and preserving scarce water resources to protect citizens' health).
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Taylor.97 Maine had a statute barring the importation of minnows. A bait
business attempted to import live golden shiners, a species of minnow
used as a bait fish that was also found in Maine's waters. The bait dealer
was indicted for violating the Lacey Act, 98 and the dealer moved to
dismiss, arguing that the state law was unconstitutional under the
Commerce Clause. The federal district court decided the statute was
constitutional, 99 but the court of appeals reversed the decision. 1° ° On
appeal, the Supreme Court disposed of several issues and then focused
on whether the local purpose was legitimate. The justification for the ban
was the threat posed by imported minnows to Maine's fishery. The
threats came from the possibility of introducing parasites into native
golden shiners and the potential for disrupting Maine's aquatic ecology
through the introduction of non-native species that might be
commingled with native species. For the Court's majority, the substantial
uncertainty over the ecological effects of importing non-native minnows
was a legitimate local purpose deserving protection. The Court also
concluded that less discriminatory means of protecting the fishery from
threats were unavailable. 1° 1 Two other examples will help show what the
Court feels are legitimate local interest exceptions.
02
the Supreme Court
In Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt,1
was asked to examine the validity of an Alabama statute that imposed an
additional fee on hazardous waste generated outside the state. The
Alabama Supreme Court upheld the statute, but the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed. The discriminatory higher tax on out-of-state waste was an
obvious burden on interstate commerce that could only be justified if
there was a legitimate local purpose and the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives. Alabama argued and their Supreme Court agreed
that the local purpose was to protect its citizens from toxic substances
and to conserve the environment and natural resources of the state. The
fee would be "compensatory revenue for the costs and burdens that outof-state waste generators impose by dumping their hazardous waste in
Alabama." 10 3 The risk to the health and welfare of Alabama's citizens
would be reduced by limiting the flow of hazardous wastes on
Alabama's highways. The Court recognized that these might be
legitimate local interests but questioned why only out-of-state wastes
97. 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
98. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2000). It is a crime to import wildlife contrary to state law.
Id. § 3372(a)(2)(A).
99. United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393 (D. Me. 1984).
100. United States v. Taylor, 752 F.2d 757 (1st Cir. 1985).
101. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986).
102. 504 U.S. 334 (1992).
103. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 584 So. 2d 1367, 1389 (Ala. 1991).
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had been targeted to protect these interests. The only reason for the fee
was the origin of the waste, which the Court considered to be a form of
economic protectionism. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed that reducing
the movement of waste within the state was an acceptable local purpose
and went on to point out less discriminatory alternatives that could be
used to accomplish the state's legitimate local interests. The alternatives
mentioned included an additional fee on all hazardous waste entering
the disposal site, a per-mile tax on all vehicles carrying hazardous waste,
and a cap on the total tonnage that would be accepted at the site.1 4 The
Court concluded that other local purposes, such as environmental
conservation, could be satisfied without using discriminatory methods.
The risks associated with these local purposes did not vary with the
origin of the waste.
In a similar case, the Court was asked to determine whether an
Oregon surcharge on out-of-state solid waste was a burden on
commerce.105 In-state fees for the disposal of solid waste were $0.85 per
ton while out-of-state solid waste was charged an additional $2.25. The
Court concluded that the tax was discriminatory and could only be
justified if there were a legitimate local purpose. Oregon justified the
additional surcharge as a compensatory tax. In addressing how
compensatory taxes fit into "local purposes" the Court said the
following: "Though our cases sometimes discuss the concept of the
compensatory tax as if it were a doctrine unto itself, it is merely a specific
way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate
local purpose that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory
means." 10 6 In order to justify a tax as compensatory, the state must
identify the tax burden for which the state is attempting to compensate,
the interstate tax must roughly approximate the intrastate tax, and the
events being taxed must be substantially equivalent. The Court
concluded that Oregon's tax failed under all three criteria and, therefore,
was not a compensatory tax.
States cannot discriminate against articles of commerce "unless
1°7
there is some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently."
Two exceptions have been developed. Congress can consent, and states
may be exempt when acting as market participants or when they have
some other state interest strong enough to justify an exception.

104.
105.
106.
107.

Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334,344-45 (1992).
Or. Waste Sys. Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality of Or., 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
Id. at 102.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
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D. Has Congress Given Permission to Place an Otherwise
Impermissible Burden on Commerce?
Whether Congress has given consent to an otherwise
impermissible restriction on commerce is a frequent issue in Commerce
Clause cases. In Sporhase, Nebraska claimed the 37 statutes deferring to
state water law, along with the number of congressionally approved
compacts, showed by implication that Congress intended to give
permission to place a burden on interstate commerce.108 The Court
disagreed, saying that such consent must be "expressly stated."10 9 In
Maine v. Taylor, it was argued that the Lacey Act gave states power to
regulate wildlife, but the Court disagreed, saying, "there simply is no
unambiguous statement of any congressional intent whatsoever."" 0 In
another case, Oklahoma contended that the Federal Power Act's
provision giving states power over local retail electric rates was
congressional consent to influence the movement of Wyoming coal."'
Citing precedent, the Court said that the Federal Power Act contained no
2
such exception."
One case stands out for its requirement of the need for a clear
and explicit statement from Congress. 113 Federal policy in Alaska

108.
109.

Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,958-59 (1982).
According to the Court in Sporhase v. Nebraska:
Although the 37 statutes and the interstate compacts demonstrate
Congress' deference to state water law, they do not indicate that Congress
wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on such state laws.
The negative implications of the Commerce Clause, like the mandates of
the Fourteenth Amendment, are ingredients of the valid state law to which
Congress has deferred. Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to
create a federal water law to govern water rights involved in federal
projects, nor the fact that Congress has been willing to let the States settle
their differences over water rights through mutual agreement, constitutes
persuasive evidence that Congress consented to the unilateral imposition
of unreasonable burdens on commerce. In the instances in which we have
found such consent, Congress' "'intent and policy' to sustain state
legislation from attack under the Commerce Clause" was "expressly
stated."
Id. at 959-60 (quoting New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343 (1982)
(quoting Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 427 (1946))).
110. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986).
111. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437,457-58 (1992).
112. "We.. .found nothing in the statute or legislative history 'evinc[ing] a congressional
intent "to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause."'" Id.
at 458 (quoting New Eng. Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 341 (1982) (quoting
United States v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Cal., 345 U.S. 295, 304 (1953))) (alteration in
original).
113. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
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required that timber taken from federal land be processed prior to
export. When Alaska imposed a similar requirement on state lands the
statute was challenged under the Commerce Clause. The appellate court
held that express approval was not needed because the federal policy
was so clear with respect to federal land. The Supreme Court disagreed.
"The fact that the state policy in this case appears to be consistent with
federal policy-or even that state policy furthers the goals we might
believe that Congress had in mind-is an insufficient indicium of
congressional intent." 1 4 The Court also said that the intent of Congress
must be "unmistakably clear." u5 "The requirement that Congress
affirmatively contemplate otherwise invalid state legislation is mandated
by the policies underlying dormant Commerce Clause doctrine."" 6 The
requirement for "affirmative contemplation" indicates the need for a
particular issue to be directly in front of Congress. The absence of
provisions limiting commerce in interstate compacts would preclude this
"affirmative contemplation."
E. Is There a State Interest Exception?
The second way discriminatory state statutes are acceptable is
when a state interest exception can be found. The exact parameters of
this exception are not completely clear. A state interest exception was
argued in Sporhase with regard to water being state property, but the
Supreme Court called this a legal fiction.117 However, when a state is
acting as a market participant, sufficient state interest is present. 1 8 The
114. Id.at 92.
115. Id. at91.
116. Id. at 91-92. The policy is based on representation. If states can burden commerce,
they are impacting citizens from other states who are not represented in the decision
process. Id. at 92. Congress, on the other hand, represents people from all states. Id. In this
case, Congress had been asked to change the policy and refused to do so. Id. at 93 n.8.
117. Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982). Although the Court
recognized that the state had a legitimate interest in water, it was insufficient to overcome
Commerce Clause scrutiny.
118. Sometimes the market participation exception is looked on as an independent
exception. The definition of market participation has been stretched to include many things
so that it might more appropriately be considered a form of "state interest." "State" also
includes local governments. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkston, 511 U.S.
383, 410 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting); White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc.,
460 U.S. 204 (1983). The mere fact of municipal ownership may be enough to change from
strict scrutiny required in facial discrimination to the less stringent balancing test of Pike.
[T]he fact that a municipality is acting within its traditional purview must
factor into the...determination of whether the local interests are
substantially outweighed by the burdens on interstate commerce. With
that understanding, we reverse and remand for a determination of
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exception operates when the state "is acting as a market participant,
rather than as a market regulator."" 9 Examples of states acting as market
participants include a bounty on in-state licensed junk cars,120 restricting
the sale of cement produced from a state owned cement plant to state
residents,121 and a requirement that construction projects funded by a
city employ a work force that has at least 50 percent city residents. 22
Wyoming v. Oklahoma"23 provides an interpretation of market
participant criteria. Oklahoma had a statute requiring all utilities
generating electricity with coal to purchase ten percent of their coal from
in-state sources. Wyoming, a major exporter of coal, challenged the
statute as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause. One of the
utilities was a state agency, the Grand River Dam Authority. The
Supreme Court found the statute in violation of the Commerce Clause
but said Oklahoma could rewrite its statute to require the state agency to
use Oklahoma coal under the market participant doctrine. 124 The market
12
participant exception has been argued less successfully in other cases.
The doctrine "allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the
market in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further." 126
Markets are to be narrowly defined, and the state cannot impose any
regulatory conditions outside that particular market. Thus, a state could
buy a water right and choose to sell it only to its own citizens. It could
not, however, limit a state citizen who bought the water from selling it to
someone from out of state.
F. Commerce Clause Summarized
A state could conceivably restrict water exports and pass the
constitutional tests discussed above. Assume the volume of water in a
watershed is very limited, with the only uses being a domestic water
supply for a small town and an endangered species living in the
whether the Counties' flow control laws pass constitutional muster under
the Pike balancing test.
United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Onieda-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 261 F.3d 245, 264
(2d Cir. 2001).
119. S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,93 (1984).
120. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
121. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
122. White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
123. 502 U.S. 437,459 (1992).
124. Id. at 461.
125. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 589
(1997) (dismissing the assertion without much discussion); S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
126. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. at 97.
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watershed. The city has water rights, as do a few private individuals.
Assume the city and its residents have taken every conservation measure
possible to allow water to remain in the stream for the endangered
species. In spite of that, the city has to ration water frequently and the
rest of the time there is barely enough to satisfy demands. A ban on
water exports might pass constitutional muster in this case, because the
water is needed to protect the public's health and safety. However, little
water may be available for sale and what is available would most likely
be purchased by the city. If we add other water users to the system, such
as farmers irrigating pasture, and lessen the strain on the city's supply,
the ban would fail because protecting the irrigated pasture would be
economic protectionism. Banning the export of water so someone can
benefit economically is the very thing the Commerce Clause was
designed to prevent. In most situations where water is being used for
irrigation, a ban on exports will fail. Bans designed solely to protect
economic interests are unconstitutional.
States have tried to protect their water sources by passing
nondiscriminatory statues or by trying to find a legitimate local interest.
These are only partially successful. The only way to support a complete
ban on water exports is through one of the exceptions to the Commerce
Clause. The relevant one here is whether Congress has consented. If
Congress gives its consent to an import or export ban or other
discriminatory conduct, then the constitutional prohibition can be
overcome. Congress can do this in two ways. A federal statute could be
passed allowing such state actions. Although federal legislation related
to water is common and these statutes generally defer to state water
allocation laws, Sporhase makes it clear that these federal statutes are not
consent to burden commerce. Congress can also consent by approving a
compact between two states.
IV. INTERSTATE COMPACTS
Interstate compacts are agreements between two states that are
approved by Congress. 127 Once approved, compacts are federal law that

127. See Douglas L. Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts Between States, in 4 WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS § 46.01-46.05 (Robert E. Beck ed., repl. vol. 2004) [hereinafter Grant,
Water Apportionment Compacts]; Grant, Compacts, supra note 24; Douglas L. Grant, Limiting
Liability for Long-Continued Breach of Interstate Water Allocation Compacts,43 NAT. RESOURcEs
J. 373 (2003); Hasday, supra note 24; Jerome C. Muys, InterstateWater Compacts: The Interstate
Compact and Federal-InterstateCompact (Legal Study No. 14 prepared for the Nat'l Water
Comm'n, 1971); McCormick, supra note 24.
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can preempt contradictory state law. 28 As discussed above, in order for a
federal law to create an exception to the Commerce Clause, the language
limiting the movement of water across state boundaries must be
"expressly stated" or in some way made "unmistakably clear" with the
opportunity for Congress to "affirmatively contemplate" it.129 The issue
must be "directly in front of Congress." One case from Montana
recognizes a Commerce Clause limitation as a result of congressional
30
approval of a compact.
The Yellowstone River Compact has a provision stating, "No
water shall be diverted from the Yellowstone River Basin without the
unanimous consent of all the signatory states." 131 The signatory states are
Wyoming, Montana, and North Dakota. The compact was challenged
when a company applied for a permit to take water out of the basin, and
it was denied based on the provisions of the compact. The
constitutionality of the provision was challenged and was upheld by a
three-judge federal district court. The district court said that the
"Compact was ratified by Congress [and therefore it] must be
132
interpreted as federal law, immune from Commerce Clause attacks."
The court also discussed the need for explicit statements to show intent
to immunize the state against Commerce Clause attacks. In the
Yellowstone Compact, the provision is explicit, making congressional
consent clear. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit called the three-judge district
court decision "well reasoned." 133 The court stated that there could be no
question about congressional approval. "The Compact was before
134 Although the
Congress and Congress expressly approved it."
language in the Compact in this case was clear in prohibiting out of basin
transfers without the unanimous consent of the signatory states, most
128. "When Congress approved the Compact, Congress was acting within its authority
to immunize state law from Commerce Clause objections by converting it to federal law."
Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293,296 (1983).
129. "There is no talismanic significance to the phrase "expressly stated," however; it
merely states one way of meeting the requirement that for a state regulation to be removed
from the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be
unmistakably clear. The requirement that Congress affirmatively contemplate otherwise
invalid state legislation is mandated by the policies underlying dormant Commerce Clause
doctrine." Wunnicke 467 U.S. at 91-92 (emphasis added). See also quote from Sporhase, supra
note 109.
130. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 590 F. Supp. 293, 296
(1983).
131. Yellowstone River Compact, art. X, 65 Stat. 663, 669 (1951).
132. Intake Water Co., 590 F. Supp. at 296.
133. Intake Water Co. v. Yellowstone River Compact Comm'n, 769 F.2d 568, 570 (9th

Cir. 1985).
134. Id.
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compacts have no language at all with regard to in-state or out-of-state
transfers. Absent specific language in a compact, normal state water laws
will control the transfer process.
Even if compacts are silent on transfers, congressional consent
might be inferred under limited circumstances. Compacts with language
of "permanence" and restrictions on place of use are the most likely
ways of inferring that compacts were meant to be permanent divisions.
However, most compacts are not this explicit, and thus should be looked
on as an initial allocation of water with subsequent reallocations being
controlled by state law including reallocation across state boundaries. In
determining whether compacts are meant to be permanent divisions of
water between states or an initial allocation requires an examination of
the intent of each compact as shown by the express language of the
compact. The issues here are: Does compact language expressly state the
allocation is permanent? Is use limited by spatial restrictions? Are
allocation schedules and formulas rigid? How do compacts address
transfers? Are vested rights protected? Is an equitable apportionment a
permanent allocation? What water is included?
A. Does Compact Language Expressly State the Allocation Is
Permanent?
Two compacts have clear language related to permanent
allocations, and a third might be interpreted in that way. The Colorado
River Compact divides the river "in perpetuity"135 with the upper and
lower basin each receiving "the exclusive beneficial consumptive use of
7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum."136 The Compact also states that
"[aill other rights to beneficial use of waters of the Colorado river system
shall be satisfied solely from the water apportioned to that basin in which
they are situate." 137 The use of the words "perpetuity," "exclusive," and
"solely" indicates an express intent that the apportionment be
permanent. This is supported by language in the Upper Colorado River
Compact describing the Colorado River Compact as dividing the water

135. Colorado River Compact, art. III(a)
(emphasis added). The Compact is widely
available. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Lower Colorado
Region, The Law of The River, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/glOOO/lawofrvr.html
(follow "The Colorado River Compact of 1922" hyperlink).
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. Id. art. VIII (emphasis added). This provision should not be read alone. Article VIII
recognizes perfected rights as being unimpaired. This right includes the right to sell. One
reading of this is that rights not presently perfected are the only ones that must be satisfied
solely from water apportioned to that basin.
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between the upper and lower basins "in perpetuity." 38 The Upper
Colorado River Compact likewise has language of permanence in
apportioning the water of the upper basin among the upper basin states
"in perpetuity." 139 The Upper Colorado River Compact does not use the
term "exclusive" or "solely." The third compact with language of
exclusivity is the South Platte Compact. The Compact contains a
provision for Lodgepole Creek giving Nebraska the "full and
unmolested use and benefit" 140 of the river's water above a certain point
and giving Colorado the "exclusive use and benefit" 141 of all water below
that point. The language granting Colorado exclusive use is similar to
that of the Colorado compacts. But Nebraska's full and unmolested use
could be interpreted as giving them only those rights they would
exercise under normal Nebraska law.
No other compacts include such explicit language, but there are
some phrases that are close. The Red River Compact 142 in several places
gives "free and unrestricted use of the water" 143 of a named sub-basin to
specified states. As long as certain stream flow conditions are met, the La
Plata Compact gives each state "the unrestricted right to use all the
waters within its boundaries" 144 The Big Blue Compact gives Nebraska
"free and unrestricted use." 145 Free and unrestricted use means that
normal state water law should apply. In Nebraska, at least, the compact
is specific and states that the free and unrestricted "use shall be in
accordance with the laws of the state of Nebraska .... 146 Water rights
established under state laws include a right to transfer water including a
right to transfer water across state boundaries. The implication is that the
apportionments in those compacts were meant to be an initial allocation
of water and not a permanent one. Normal state water law concerning
transfers was meant to apply.
Even with language of permanence present in the Colorado
River Compact, proposals have been made that would move water from

138. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. I, 63 Stat. 31, 31 (1949).
139. Id. art. III(a), 63 Stat. at 32.
140. South Platte River Compact, art. III(2), 44 Stat. 195, 196 (1926).
141. Id.
142. Red River Compact, 94 Stat.3305 (1980).
143. Id. art. IV, § 4.02(b) (sub-basin in Oklahoma), § 4.03(b) (sub-basin in Texas), art. VI,
§ 6.04(b) (Louisiana sub-basin), art. VII, § 7.02(b) (reach in Arkansas). See also Arkansas
River Basin Compact, Kansas-Oklahoma, arts. V, VI, 80 Stat. 1409, 1410-11 (1966).
144. La Plata River Compact, art. II (2)(a), 43 Stat. 796, 797 (1925).
145. Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, art. V, § 5.2,86 Stat. 193, 196 (1972).
146. Id.
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the upper to the lower basin. 147 Many commentators feel this would be
14
difficult if not impossible.A
Restrictions on transfers between the lower
basin states are certainly allowable. Here there is no compact with any
type of restrictive language, and new regulations by the Bureau of
Reclamation have been put in place to facilitate transfers. 149 Even where
there is language of exclusivity or permanence, another interpretation is
possible. The language could mean that the right would be permanently
or exclusively administered by the state that was allocated the water.
Any transfer out of state would require approval of the state following
normal state transfer laws. The water right would continue under the
jurisdiction of the originating state, and their law would control
subsequent transfers. Many compacts have language giving the state
where the water is diverted jurisdiction over some aspects of the
acquisition or delivery process when the water is used in another state.'50
B. Is Use Limited by Spatial Restrictions?
Some compacts contain spatial restrictions that may impact
water markets. Three different types of spatial restrictions are at issue:
transfers or uses are only allowed within a river basin or sub-basin, uses
are limited to an irrigation district, and the place of use, not point of
diversion or storage, is charged for the allocation. Restricting use to a
particular basin is found on the Yellowstone,15' the Big Blue, 152 the

147. David Elliott Prange, Note, Regional Water Scarcity and the Galloway Proposal, 17
ENVTL. L. 81, 82-83 (1986). The proposal would have moved 300,000 to 500,000 acre-feet a
year to southern California. The project is no longer active.
148. See, e.g., Sharon P. Gross, Student Article, The Galloway Project and the ColoradoRiver
Compacts: Will the Compacts Bar Transbasin Diversion?, 25 NAT. RESOURcES J. 935, 953-56
(1985). See also David H. Getches, Colorado River Governance: Sharing Federal Authority as an
Incentive to Create a New Institution, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 573 (1997); David H. Getches,
Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 420 (1985); David J. Guy,
When the Law Dulls the Edge of Chance: Transferring Upper Basin Water to the Lower Colorado
River Basin, 1991 UTAH L. REV. 25; James S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on
California's Claims to Water from the Colorado River Part I. The Law of the River, 4 U. DENY.
WATER L. REv. 290 (2001); Marjorie A. Miller, Water Export: Is It Legal Yet?, 24 CoLo. LAW.
817 (1995); Allen D. Freemyer & Craig M. Bunnell, Comment, Legal Impediments to Interstate
Water Marketing: Application to Utah, 9 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 237 (1989); LaBianca, supra note
18.
149. Arizona Water Bank, 43 C.F.R. § 414.1 (2005); see supra note 18.
150. See, e.g., Belle Fourche River Compact, art. VII, 58 Stat. 94, 97 (1944); Klamath River
Basin Compact, art. VI(B), 71 Stat. 497, 501 (1957); Republican River Compact, art. VIII, 57
Stat. 86, 89 (1943).
151. Yellowstone River Compact, art. X, 65 Stat. 663, 669 (1951).
152. Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, art. V, § 5.4, 86 Stat. 193, 197 (1972)
(requiring approval of compact administration to export water from the basin).
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Snake,153 and the Klamath. 154 Most of these limitations are silent about
transfers between the states that are signatory to the compact. The
limitation is generally only explicit as to whether the water is used inside
the basin or outside. The Colorado River Compact appears explicit about
water transfers between the upper and lower basin states, but sales are
allowed between the lower basin states. 5 5 Only the Klamath has an
absolute prohibition against transfers.' 56 If transfers outside the basin are
allowed to a state that is a compact signatory, then transfers should be
57
allowed under the same conditions to a state outside the basin.
In the Arkansas River Compact between Colorado and Kansas,
the restriction is on the transfer of waters outside an irrigation district. If
the quantity of water available for use in the district or in Kansas will be
materially depleted, then district rights shall not "be transferred to other
water districts in Colorado...."158 Although at first reading this appears
to be a spatial limitation on transfers, it probably has little effect beyond
applying normal Colorado law to protect Kansas water users. Normally,
transfers would not be approved under Colorado law if they would
"injuriously effect" other Colorado water users.159
Several other compacts have explicit statements making charges
against each state's apportionment based on place of use rather than
point of diversion or storage. This allows water to be developed in one
state for use in another. The Upper Colorado Compact allows water from
named tributaries to be diverted or stored in one state and used in
another. The tributaries include the La Plata, 16° Little Snake, 161 Henry's
Fork, 162 Yampa, 163 and San Juan,164 with the place of use determining
153. Snake River Compact, art. IV, 64 Stat. 29, 31 (1950) (specifying that Wyoming
cannot divert water outside the Snake basin without Idaho's consent and Idaho cannot
divert water from the Salt River basin without Wyoming's consent). This would not
prevent sale of water between the two states since presumably the state would consent to a
transfer outside the basin if the sale was to its own citizens.
154. Klamath River Basin Compact, art. III(B)(2)(a), 71 Stat. 497, 499 (1957) (prohibiting
diversions from the upper Klamath basin). The upper basin is partly in California and
partly in Oregon. Sales could take place across the state line as long as the place of use
remained within the valley.
155. See Arizona Water Bank, supra note 149.
156. Klamath River Basin Compact, art. III(B)(2), (3), 71 Stat. 497,499 (1957).
157. Wyoming's statutory additions to the Yellowstone Compact have added criteria for
approving out of basin transfers and imply that transfers cannot be made outside the three
Yellowstone River Compact states. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-12-607(b), (c) (1999).
158. Arkansas River Compact, art. V(H), 63 145,148-49 (1949).
159. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-92-305(3) (West 2003).
160. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. X, 63 Stat. 31, 38 (1949).
161. Id. art. XI, 63 Stat. at 38-39.
162. Id. art. XII, 63 Stat. at 39-40.
163. Id. art. XIII, 63 Stat. at 40.
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where the apportionment will be charged. Although this was designed
to allow storage and diversion works constructed in one state to benefit
users in another state, it may have an impact on transferring other rights.
The Compact is quite specific for all of these tributaries of the upper
Colorado charging "all consumptive use of the waters of the [named
river] and its tributaries shall be charged... to the state in which the use is
made." 165 The Animas-La Plata Project Compact adopts the limiting
language from the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact. 166 In the
Arkansas River Compact (Kansas-Oklahoma), new conservation storage
that is constructed subsequent to the Compact "shall be charged against
the state in which the use is made."167 This would not apply to existing
rights based on stored water or any right established without storage
regardless of when the right was established. In the Arkansas River
Basin Compact (Arkansas-Oklahoma), the compact is more restrictive,
stating, "Depletion in annual yield.. .caused by the operation of any
water storage reservoir either heretofore or hereafter constructed... shall
168
be charged against the state in which the yield therefrom is utilized."
The question is whether "charging against the place where use is made"
is a permanent spatial allocation of the water rights associated with the
use. For reasons developed below, we feel this is only an initial allocation
of the rights.
C. Are Allocation Schedules and Formulas Rigid?
An argument can be made that apportionments at a specific
point or points based on gage information permanently fixes an
allocation. After all, these allocations are measurable by gages and either
a fixed percentage or schedule of delivery allocates an amount. 169 Not all
compacts use percentages or delivery schedules. 170 In order for this to be
a permanent allocation, no adjustments in water volume should be
possible. Most compacts envision circumstances that will require
adjustments to what would otherwise be a rigid system. For example,

164. Id. art. XIV, 63 Stat. at 40-41.
165. See, e.g., id. art. XI(g), 63 Stat. at 39.
166. Animas-La Plata Compact, art. 1(B), 82 Stat. 898, 898 (1968).
167. Arkansas River Basin Compact, Kansas-Oklahoma, art. VII(B), 80 Stat. 1409, 1411
(1966).
168. Arkansas River Basin Compact, Arkansas-Oklahoma, art. VI(B), 87 Stat. 569, 571
(1973).
169. See, e.g., id. art. IV, 87 Stat. at 570; Rio Grande Compact, arts. III, IV, 53 Stat. 785,
787-88 (1939).

170. See generally Zachary McCormick, Interstate Water Allocation Compacts in the Western
United States - Some Suggestions, 30 WATER REsouRCEs BULL. 385, 387 (1994).
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many compacts have provisions stating that imported water will not be
charged to the state's apportionment under the compact or they will
have exclusive use of it. i

n

1

Most of these compacts are silent as to the

actual way a state will avoid having this count toward their
apportionment, but in several cases it will require a change in the way
gage information is interpreted. 172 Also, compacts commonly allow
diversion works or storage to be built in one state where the use of water
will be in another state. 173 This can change the timing and rate of delivery
at the point where the allocation is measured, requiring an accounting
adjustment. Other compacts have provisions stating non-use is not
abandonment. 174 Somehow "non-use" must be accounted for in
percentage allocations and then adjustments must be made when use
actually begins. Other compacts envision adjustments as a result of
natural conditions or human changes. The Pecos is one of the most
complex compacts, with adjustments made for "depletions by man's
activities, state line flows, quantities of water salvaged, and quantities of
unappropriated flood waters." 175 The Arkansas River Basin Compact
(Kansas-Oklahoma) simply requires "proper accounting of new
conservation storage capacities.... "176 If a compact contemplates such
accounting type adjustments either through specific language or through
operational requirements, why not similar adjustments for sales across
state boundaries?

171. Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, art. V, § 5.4, 86 Stat. 193, 197; Pecos
River Compact, art. VII, 63 Stat. 159, 164 (1949); Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.09, 94 Stat.
3305, 3306 (1978); Rio Grande Compact, art. X, 53 Stat. at 790; Upper Colorado River Basin
Compact, art. XVII, 63 Stat. 31, 41-42 (1949).
172. See, e.g., Rio Grande Compact, arts. III, IV, 53 Stat. at 787-88 (The compact uses
delivery schedules based on measurements at specified gages. The schedules do not
include water imported into the basin even though it is measured at the gages.); Upper
Colorado River Basin Compact, arts. III, XVII, 63 Stat. at 32-33, 41-42 (Arizona is allocated
a fixed amount, the other upper basin states are allocated percentages of the amount
remaining, and imports are not considered as compact water. Therefore, the compact
anticipated adjusting the percentages in some fashion not explained in the compact.).
173. See, e.g., Belle Fourche River Compact, art VI, 58 Stat. 94, 96-97 (1944); Snake River
Compact, art. VII(A), 64 Stat. 29, 32 (1950); Yellowstone River Compact, art. VIII, 65 Stat.
663, 668-69 (1950).
174. Belle Fourche River Compact, art. V(A), 58 Stat. at 96 (a state may divert or store
"any unused part of the.. .percentages allotted to the other, but no continuing right shall be
established thereby"); Pecos River Compact, art. X, 63 Stat. at 164 (failure to use is not a
relinquishment); Snake River Compact, art. X, 64 Stat. at 33 (failure to use is not a
relinquishment); Upper Colorado River Compact, art. XVI, 63 Stat. at 41 (non-use is not a
forfeiture or abandonment).
175. Pecos River Compact, art. VI(b), 63 Stat. at 163.
176. Arkansas River Compact, Kansas-Oklahoma, art. VIII(D), 80 Stat. 1409, 1412 (1966).
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Compacts that use a point to determine a percentage allocation
or a schedule of delivery generally have some mechanism for making
adjustments. These provisions are not meant to be rigid or permanent
allocations. With flexibility built into the compacts, adjustments for
interstate transfers should also be possible. To interpret the compacts
differently would require a federal court to infer that Congress intended
to allow adjustments for some purposes, but not adjustments for sales
across state boundaries. The best way to interpret compacts is that they
are initial divisions of water, which can be adjusted under a variety of
circumstances. They are not rigid or permanent.
D. How Do Compacts Address Transfers?
Compacts are almost completely silent on transfers. The Costilla
Creek Compact is an exception and specifically allows "New Mexico to
change the points of diversion and places of use.. .provided, however,
that the rights so transferred shall be limited in each instance to the
quantity of water actually consumed on the lands from which the right is
transferred." 177 This requirement is no different than current New
Mexico law on transfers. The compact is silent on whether the transfer
can be across the state boundary into Colorado. As mentioned above, the
Arkansas River Compact has language about transfers outside an
irrigation district, 178 but this provision does not change the way state law
would operate without the compact. The Arkansas River Compact
(Kansas-Oklahoma) allows water exports from a sub-basin but is not
very specific. 179 Any limitations on the conservation capacity of the subbasin would be applied to the exported water.
With most compacts silent on transfers, what law should control
them? Absent specific language in a compact, the normal state law on
transfers should control the transfer of water rights. Without an explicit
statement that Congress could affirmatively contemplate, it would be
difficult for a court to imply transfers are prohibited. In addition, many
compacts have language in them saying that the appropriation doctrine
or state law is not changed by the compact.18a Even without such a

177. Costilla Creek Compact, art. V(a), 60 Stat. 246, 250 (1946), amended by 77 Stat. 350
(1963).
178. Arkansas River Compact, art. V(H), 63 Stat. 145, 148-49 (1949).
179. Arkansas River Basin Compact, Kansas-Oklahoma, art. VIII(B), 80 Stat. 1409, 1412
(1966). See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (discussing spatial limitations).
180. See, e.g., Red River Compact, art. II, § 2.01, 94 Stat. 3305, 3306 (1980) ("Each state
may freely administer water rights and uses in accordance with the laws of that state....").
See also Colorado River Compact, supra note 135, art. IV(c) ("The provisions of this article
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provision, the compact would have to directly contradict state law before

it would be superceded.1al With only a few compacts prohibiting
transfers out of the basin, state law would allow such transfers in all
other instances. Thus, a compact that is silent on transfers could allow instate transfers under the normal operation of state law. Most state laws
also have provisions controlling the way transfers to out-of-state users
can be made.18 2 If state law has not been superceded by the compact,
then transfers outside the state should be possible. To interpret a
compact differently, a court would be asked to infer that Congress
intended to allow transfers inside a state, but not transfers outside the
state. This type of discrimination goes to the very heart of the Commerce
Clause.
The counter argument is that, when the compacts were
approved by Congress, states did have laws banning exports. Under
normal operation of state law, exports would have been prohibited.
However, states cannot unilaterally impose barriers to commerce.
Congress must do it. Without specific language in the compact banning
transfers, Congress has not consented to a barrier to commerce. Silence
in the compacts means normal state law will be used for transfers, but
not state laws that are unconstitutional. Reinforcing this argument is the
specific recognition in some compacts of vested rights.
E. Are Vested Rights Protected?
Several compacts have language stating that vested or present
perfected rights are unimpaired or that state law is applicable to the
rights. 183 Even if a compact is not specific on this issue, a water right is a
property right protected by the Constitution. 184 A compact cannot
change existing rights in ways that "take" the right without
shall not apply to or interfere with the regulation and control by any state within its
boundaries of the appropriation, use and distribution of water.").
181. Several compacts do this by saying non-use is not an abandonment-this is not
quite like an individual right since it is the state's compact allocation that cannot be
abandoned. See supra note 174.
182. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-292 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-81101(3) (West 2004); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-203A(5) (2003), 42-222(1) (Supp. 2006); MONT.
CODE. ANN. § 85-2-311(4) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 46-233.01 (2004) (surface water), 46613.01 (2004) (ground water); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 733a-101 to 73-3a109 (Supp. 2006). See also Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export,
supranote 23, §§ 48.01 to 48.03.
183. See, e.g., Belle Fourche River Compact, art. V(B), 58 Stat. 94, 96 (1944); Colorado
River Compact, supra note 135, art. VIII; Sabine River Compact, art. III, 68 Stat. 690, 692
(1954); Yellowstone River Compact, art.V(D), 65 Stat. 663, 667 (1951).
184. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001).
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compensation. One of the major elements of a property right is the right
to sell it. Selling a water right includes, among other things, the right to
transfer its place of use.
The line between regulating property rights and unconstitutional takings is not a clear one. 185 Property values can be reduced to
some extent without a taking, but if the value is reduced to zero a taking
has occurred.186 For example, a farmer has a water right. The land the
water is being used on suddenly becomes unproductive, and the farmer
desires to sell her water right. The water right is very valuable, but the
land is worthless. Even if the water is used on the land, nothing of value
can be produced. A statute preventing the sale of the water right could
be interpreted as taking the entire value of the right, because the water
would have no value unless it is transferred to another place of use. The
statute would be unconstitutional. Even without a full loss, reducing the
value of a right could be considered a restraint of trade. Restraints on
87
trade are often discouraged as bad policy.
Because vested or perfected rights are protected in compacts,
transfers are allowed. Without specific language limiting the new
location for a transferred right, the transfer can be out of state.
F. Is an Equitable Apportionment a Permanent Allocation?
Compacts generally state that the intent of the compact is to
achieve an equitable apportionment.1 8 The question here is whether an
equitable apportionment is a permanent allocation. The first Supreme
185. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp.
Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). See also Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare
Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551
(2002); David L. Callies, Takings: An Introduction and Overview, 24 U. HAw. L. REv. 441
(2002); Christopher L. Harris & Daniel J. Lowenberg, Recent Development: Kelo v. City of
New London, Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States, and Washoe
County v. United States: A Fifth Amendment Takings Primer, 36 ST. MARY'S L.J. 669 (2005);
Jeffrey A. Wilcox, Note, Taking Cover: Fifth Amendment Takings Jurisprudence as a Tool for
Resolving Water Disputes in the American West, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 477 (2003).
186. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
187. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (passed in 1890 and prohibiting
restraints of trade).
188. See, e.g., Arkansas River Compact, art. I(B), 63 Stat. 145, 145 (1949); Bear River
Compact, art. I(A), 72 Stat. 38 (1955), amended by 94 Stat. 4 (1980); Costilla Creek Compact,
art. I, 60 Stat. 246, 246 (1946), amended by 77 Stat. 350 (1963); Rio Grande Compact, pmbl., 53
Stat. 785, 785 (1939); Upper Niobrara River Compact, art I, 83 Stat. 86, 87 (1969);
Yellowstone River Compact, pmbl, 65 Stat. 663, 663 (1951).
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Court case to use the equitable apportionment standard was in 1907,
long before the first compact was negotiated. 189 Indeed, the Supreme
Court has encouraged states to negotiate compacts rather than bring
disputes to the Court. 19° Although an equitable apportionment is the
purpose behind most compacts, the term is not defined within the
compacts themselves. To understand the meaning of equitable
apportionment, we need to look at outside sources. Recognizing that an
equitable apportionment by the Supreme Court is not the same as an
apportionment under an interstate compact, it is still appropriate to look
at the Supreme Court's use of the doctrine because they originated it.
In the first equitable apportionment suit, Kansas farmers claimed
that they were being harmed by the upstream withdrawal of water by
Colorado irrigators. The Court examined the agricultural production in
the two states and determined that, although the amount of water in the
Arkansas River had been reduced, the production of corn and wheat in
Kansas had generally increased. The Court went on to conclude:
the diminution of the flow of water in the river by the
irrigation of Colorado has worked some detriment to the
southwestern part of Kansas, and yet when we compare the
amount of this detriment with the great benefit which has
obviously resulted in the counties in Colorado, it would
seem that equality of right and equity between the two
States forbids any interference with the present withdrawal
of water in Colorado for purposes of irrigation. 191
Equality of right does not mean an "equal division of water, but
to [an] equal level or plane on which all the states stand, in point of
power and right, under our constitutional system." 192 The result was a
balancing process with the great benefit to Colorado offsetting the harm
in Kansas. Any other conclusion would at most have shifted some
irrigation from Colorado to Kansas. The net overall economic gain
would have been negligible. The balance favored Colorado at this time
because Kansas failed to make a case that they were really harmed by
Colorado's actions. However, the Court left open the possibility of future
litigation: "if the depletion of the waters of the river by Colorado
continues to increase there will come a time when Kansas may justly say
that there is no longer an equitable division of benefits and may
189. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). See generally Muys, supra note 127.
190. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 575-76 (1983); Oklahoma v. New
Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 241 (1991).
191. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 114-15.
192. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,465 (1922).
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rightfully call for relief... ."193 Although the action was dismissed, Kansas
was told new proceedings could be introduced if the "substantial
interests of Kansas are being injured to the extent of destroying the
equitable apportionment of the benefits between the two states..." 194
Equity thus can change with time and the circumstances of use. The
doctrine is meant to be flexible.
Kansas tried again in 1943, but once again failed to prove that
195
increased irrigation in Colorado was detrimental to farming in Kansas.
The Court described these disputes between quasi-sovereigns as
presenting "complicated and delicate questions, and, due to the
possibility of future change of conditions, necessitat[ing] expert
administration rather than judicial imposition of a hard and fast rule.
Such controversies may appropriately be composed by negotiation and
196
agreement, pursuant to the compact clause of the federal constitution."
The Court was suggesting the need for a compact because changing
circumstances influence evaluations in equity. Equitable apportionments
need flexibility.
The need to consider changes in circumstances was incorporated
into another Supreme Court decision. 197 In resolving the dispute over the
North Platte River, the Court included a re-opener provision in its decree
allowing a reconsideration of the apportionment upon a change in
conditions. 198 Changes in conditions include both modification to a water
supply and new developments that change water availability. 199
However, before the court will re-open an equitable apportionment
193. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 117.
194. Id. Other states have had problems proving injury. See, e.g., Washington v. Oregon,
297 U.S. 517 (1936); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Connecticut v.
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931).
195. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
As has been pointed out, despite Colorado's alleged increased depletion,
the acreage under irrigation in western Kansas through existing ditches
has steadily increased, over the period 1895-1939, from approximately
15,000 acres to approximately 56,000 acres. Moreover, the arid lands in
western Kansas are underlaid at shallow depths with great quantities of
ground water available for irrigation by pumping at low initial and
maintenance cost. There is persuasive testimony that farmers who could
be served from existing ditches have elected not to take water therefrom
but to install pumping systems because of lower cost.
Id. at 399.
196. Id. at 392.
197. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). See also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S.
1 (1995); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584 (1993). In the 1995 case, Wyoming wanted the
Supreme Court to redo its equitable apportionment. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. at 4.
198. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 620-23.
199. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. at 590; Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 620.
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decision there must be a showing of substantial injury.200 As in the cases
on the Arkansas River, the Court is reluctant to make a determination in
such disputes, preferring that the states work things out themselves.
However, it is also quite clear that changing circumstances can create a
substantial change in the equities so that a re-balancing is required. Some
compacts even have language in them which allows them to be
periodically re-examined. For example, the Bear River Compact requires
a re-evaluation every 20 years. 201
Determining which factors to consider in making an equitable
apportionment also sheds light on the doctrine. On the Laramie River, in
a dispute between Colorado and Wyoming, the Court determined that a
fair division of the river would be to apply the appropriation doctrine as
if there were no state boundary. 2°2 The division based on the prior
appropriation doctrine was equitable because both states used that
doctrine. 203 Wyoming was objecting in part to Colorado taking water out
of the watershed, but the Court said such diversions were a common
part of the appropriation doctrine recognized by both states. 20 4
Strict adherence to the prior appropriation doctrine is not
required in all equitable apportionment cases. In Nebraska v. Wyoming,
the Court expanded the factors considered to include:
physical and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of
water in the several sections of the river, the character and
rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful
uses on downstream areas, [and] the damage to upstream
areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a
limitation is imposed on the former.... 205
In discussing the kind of decree needed for an equitable
apportionment, the court said the decree must deal with current
conditions, and if those conditions "substantially change, the decree can
be adjusted to meet the new conditions." 2 6 Thus, change in equities over
time is an inherent part of the doctrine of equitable apportionment.
The dispute between Colorado and New Mexico on the Vermejo
River sheds additional light on interpreting the doctrine of equitable

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. at 593.
Bear River Compact, art. XIV, 72 Stat. 38,47 (1955), amended by 94 Stat. 4 (1980).
Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,468 (1922).
Id. at 470.
Id. at 466-67.
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,618 (1945).
Id. at 620.
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apportionment. 2 7 Colorado water users wanted to divert water from the
Vermejo River, which was already fully appropriated in New Mexico. 2°8
Strict application of the rules of priority under the appropriation
doctrine would have precluded Colorado's diversions for a future use,
but the special master's recommendation to the Supreme Court did not
follow this strict interpretation and would have allowed Colorado to
divert 4,000 acre-feet of Vermejo River water. 2°9 The special master
justified the recommendation in part because one of the New Mexico
users, an irrigation district, was not economically viable and the future
uses in Colorado would be of greater benefit. 21° In addition, the special
master felt that conservation measures in New Mexico could compensate
for part of Colorado's diversion. New Mexico objected to the
recommendation and argued that the rule of prior appropriation should
be strictly applied. The Supreme Court disagreed with New Mexico's
interpretation of the doctrine, calling it "inflexible." 211 Waste,
inefficiency, and conservation potential can all be considered in making
an equitable apportionment, and the harms and benefits of competing
states must be weighed against each other.212 Although the equity in
protecting an existing economy will be considered in this balancing
process, future benefits in another state can at times outweigh existing
uses.213 Although the Supreme Court supported the special master's
interpretation of the doctrine of equitable apportionment, it found the
report did not contain sufficient findings of fact to support the
application of the principle. 214 On remand, the special master reaffirmed
his recommendation to allow Colorado to divert 4,000 acre-feet per
year. 215 However, the Supreme Court rejected the recommendation
because Colorado did not prove through clear or specific evidence that
216
conservation measures in New Mexico were feasible.
The doctrine of equitable apportionment as used by the Supreme
Court has several clear meanings. The doctrine is meant to be flexible
with no single formula or set of criteria applicable to all situations.

207. Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
208. Id. at 177.
209. Id. at 180.
210. Id. at 180-81.
211. Id. at 184
212. Id. at 184-86.
213. Id. at 187.
214. Id. at 182-83.
215. Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 315 (1984).
216. Id. at 319-20. The conservation measures must be "financially and physically
feasible" and "within practicable limits." Id. (citing Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176,
192 (1982); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,484 (1922)).
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Balancing harms and benefits requires a consideration of all possible
factors. Existing uses may not always be protected in this balancing
process. Wasteful practices and the potential for conservation will be
considered. Equity changes with the passage of time and the change of
circumstances. If substantial injury occurs because of changing circumstances, a reapportionment may be appropriate. Because compacts use
equitable apportionment as their goal or intent, compact interpretation
must take into consideration the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
doctrine. This includes changing circumstances that require a
rebalancing of the equities. The potential for rebalancing means
equitable apportionments are not permanent. One way to rebalance the
equities is to let markets operate across state boundaries.
G. Is Ground Water Included?
The last issue to be considered is whether ground water is
included in the compact and therefore subject to any restrictions the
217
compact might contain. Only a few compacts mention ground water. If
ground water is not included, the normal state laws controlling transfers
are applicable. The few compacts that mention ground water will be
examined here. In the Klamath Compact, the term "water" does not
include "water extracted from underground sources until after such
28
water is used and becomes surface return flow or waste water." 1
Although ground water is mentioned in the Compact, it is specifically
excluded from compact requirements until after it has been used on the
surface. The Big Blue Compact requires that Nebraska regulate wells
within one mile of the river in order to maintain the schedule of delivery.
The provision only applies to wells established after November 1,
1968.219 Pre-1968 wells and wells more than a mile from the river are
excluded from compact requirements. The Niobrara Compact recognizes
that groundwater use may impact surface flows but delays
apportionment until further studies are done. 220 In El Paso I, the New
Mexico federal district court was asked to evaluate whether tributary
ground water was apportioned by the Rio Grande Compact. The court
concluded that ground water was not included in the compact, but left
the door open for conjunctive management. If the State Engineer does

217. Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, art. V, § 5.2(b)(4), 86 Stat. 193, 196-97
(1972); Klamath River Basin Compact, art. II(G), 71 Stat. 497, 498 (1957); Upper Niobrara
River Compact, arts. I(A), VI, 83 Stat. 86, 87, 89 (1969).
218. Klamath River Basin Compact, art. H(G), 71 Stat. at 498.
219. Kansas-Nebraska Big Blue River Compact, art. V, § 5.2(b)(4), 86 Stat. at 196-97.
220. Upper Niobrara River Compact, art. VI, 83 Stat. at 89.
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manage surface and ground water conjunctively, the management
system must be applied "evenhandedly to both New Mexico and out-ofstate appropriators." 221 This case will be discussed in more detail below.
Compacts, by virtue of their silence, leave groundwater marketing
almost entirely under the control of state water laws and Commerce
Clause requirements.
As can be seen from the answers to the above questions, few
compacts place significant restrictions on the marketing of water across
state boundaries. Limitations on water marketing are generally not
"expressly stated" or made "unmistakably clear." Congress did not
"affirmatively contemplate" provisions that would interfere with the free
movement of water across state boundaries. As a result, implying that
Congress intended to place a burden on interstate commerce will be
difficult in most cases. The Rio Grande Compact is examined below to
see if anything can be found that would suggest water transfers are
limited.
V. THE RIO GRANDE COMPACT
Allocation of the waters of the Rio Grande between Colorado,
New Mexico, and Texas is controlled in part by the Rio Grande
Compact. 222 The history behind the Compact is typical of many western
rivers. In this case, increased water use for irrigation upstream in
Colorado and New Mexico began to affect water users in the El Paso
area."' In order to gain time to resolve this problem, an embargo was
placed on using public lands for diverting Rio Grande water. Pressure
from Mexico and U.S. residents around El Paso led to a treaty in 1906224
and the construction of Elephant Butte reservoir. 225 These two events
were the beginning of the apportionment process. Once the embargo was
lifted in 1925, increased development led to additional conflicts. In 1929,
a temporary compact was negotiated. The 1929 compact did not
apportion the river but attempted to restrict new developments and fix

221. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso 1), 563 F. Supp. 379, 387 (D.N.M. 1983).
222. Rio Grande Compact, 53 Stat. 785 (1939).
223. William A. Paddock, The Rio Grande Convention of 1906: A Brief History of an
Internationaland Interstate Apportionment of the Rio Grande, 77 DENY. U. L. REv. 287, 294-95
(1999) [hereinafter Paddock, Rio Grande Convention].
224. Convention Between the United States and Mexico Providing for the Equitable
Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, U.S.-Mex., May 21,
1906, 34 Stat. 2953 (1906).
225. Elephant Butte was authorized in 1905, before the treaty with Mexico was ratified.
Act of Feb. 25, 1905, ch. 798, 33 Stat. 814.
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in place current consumptive amounts. 226 The temporary compact did
227
not alleviate tensions as Texas brought litigation against New Mexico.
Eventually a final compact was signed in 1938 after significant
negotiation. 2
A. Interpreting the Rio Grande Compact
To understand the Rio Grande Compact we look at the compact
language in view of the discussion above to see if there are any
indications of a permanent division or spatial restrictions on place of use.
The allocation schedules need to be examined to determine whether they
are rigid or have built-in flexibility. The Compact also needs to be
examined to determine how transfers are addressed and whether vested
rights receive specific protection. The meaning of equitable
apportionment within the Compact will be discussed as well as whether
ground water is included.
The Compact has absolutely no language in it relating to a
permanent division of water or that the water is for a state's exclusive
use. 9 The Compact was negotiated and signed after the Colorado River
Compact and the negotiators would have been aware of the language in
that compact specifying that the division between the upper and lower
basin was permanent and exclusive. The failure to include language
related to a permanent and exclusive allocation means the allocation
should be looked upon as an initial allocation with adjustments
contemplated.
The Compact also is silent on placing spatial restrictions on
where the water can be used. Restrictions on use within the watershed
are absent. No limitations on transfers are included. The compact
contains no language that would have place of use as the determining
factor in making charges against an allocation. With no spatial
restrictions on place of use, Rio Grande water should be freely
transferable both inside and outside the watershed. This would include
transfers outside the state.

226. Rio Grande Compact of 1929,46 Stat. 767 (1930).
227. Texas v. New Mexico, 296 U.S. 547 (1935) (mem.).
228. Rio Grande Compact, 53 Stat. 785 (1939). See generally Raymond A. Hill,
Development of the Rio Grande Compact of 1938,14 NAT. REsoURCES J. 163 (1974); Paddock, Rio
Grande Convention, supra note 223; Paddock, Rio Grande Compact, supra note 28; S.E.
Reynolds & Philip B. Mutz, Water Deliveries Under the Rio Grande Compact, 14 NAT.
RESOuRCES J. 201 (1974).
229. The words "permanent," "perpetuity," "exclusive," and "solely" are not used in
the compact.
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The allocation schedules only create an "obligation" to deliver a
specified volume of water at a specific point according to the schedule of
delivery. 230 The obligation can be changed by operation of a significant
number of variables. The delivery obligation for Colorado will be
corrected to account for reservoirs constructed after 1937 above Del
Norte, Colorado. 231 Adjustments to the Colorado schedule of delivery
can be made for changing the location of a gaging station, for depletion
232
of runoff above the gaging stations, and for imports into the basin.
Adjustments to the New Mexico schedule of delivery can be made for
changing the location of a gaging station, any depletion after 1929 in the
natural runoff in New Mexico above Otowi Bridge, depletions in run-off
during the summer months caused by works constructed on tributaries
between Otowi Bridge and San Marcial after 1937, and any transfers into
the basin between Lobatos and San Marcial. 233 Water imported into the
234
basin will be credited to the state that has a right to use the water.
Clearly, some type of accounting system is contemplated in order to take
into account all of the potential modifications to the schedule. In
addition, the compact contemplates over and under delivery, which is
accounted for by debits and credits. 235 The only reason given for not
increasing or decreasing the schedule of delivery is to accommodate
deliveries to Mexico. 236 The two schedules for delivery are meant to be
flexible and to account for changes in the system. An accounting system
is required to accommodate these changes. There is no reason this same
accounting system could not be used to account for sales of water
between the different divisions on the river.

230. Rio Grande Compact, arts. III, IV, 53 Stat. at 787-88. The Compact specified two
key points at which to measure delivery obligations: (1) Colorado is obligated to deliver
water to Lobatos, near the Colorado border, based on a schedule derived from the inflows
into the basin from the Rio Grande (measured at Del Norte) and tributaries of the Conejos
River; (2) New Mexico was originally obligated to deliver water to San Marcial above
Elephant Butte based on a schedule derived from the flows at Otowi Bridge. Id. In 1948, the
San Marcial gaging station was abandoned. New Mexico's obligation is now based on
measurements at a gaging station below Elephant Butte Dam. Rio Grande Compact
Comm'n, Resolution Changing Gaging Stations and Measurements of Deliveries by New
Mexico (1948), available at http://www.ose.state.nm.us/PDF/ISC/ISC-Compacts/RioGrande_-Compact.pdf.
231. Rio Grande Compact, art. 111(3), 53 Stat. at 787. Also, New Mexico's obligation will
be corrected for the operation of reservoirs constructed after 1929 for reservoirs between
Lobatos and Otowi Bridge. Id. art. IV(5), 53 Stat. at 788.
232. Id. art 111(4), 53 Stat. at 788.
233. Id. art. IV(6), 53 Stat. at 788.
234. Id. art. X, 53 Stat. at 790.
235. Id. art. VI, 53 Stat. at 789.
236. Id. art. XIV, 53 Stat. at 792.
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The Compact is silent on transfers. This means that normal state
water law will apply.23 7 With the Sporhase decision, that means transfers
outside the state must be allowed under substantially the same
circumstances as transfers inside the state. Sporhase and subsequent
decisions do allow some differences between in-state and out-of-state
transfer as will be discussed below in the section on state laws. The point
is that the Rio Grande Compact says nothing at all about a transfer
process.
Even though the Rio Grande Compact is silent on protecting
vested rights, state law will give them protection. A water right is a
property right.238 The right to change the place of use of water is inherent
in the right and is an incident of property ownership. 239 Limiting the
location of water transfers and thus restricting potential buyers is not
something property rights holders would generally support. Restricting
transfer locations is a restraint on the alienation of property, which is not
done lightly. 240 In addition, restricting transfers could result in an
unconstitutional taking of property as discussed above.
The Compact does state that the purpose of the Compact is to
achieve an equitable apportionment between the states.241 As was
discussed above, the allocation under an equitable apportionment can
change as circumstances change. Such divisions are not permanent. The
ability to market water across a state boundary is one way of making the
adjustments equity might require.
The question remains as to whether ground water is included in
the compact. A federal decision gives us an answer to that question. 242
The decision came shortly after the Sporhase decision concluded that
water was an article of commerce. 243 In City of El Paso v. Reynolds, El Paso
244
applied for a permit to take ground water from a New Mexico aquifer.
The New Mexico State Engineer refused to grant the permit, saying the
Rio Grande Compact permanently apportioned the Rio Grande between
237. "[S]tate laws continue to operate if they are consistent with the compact but not if
they are not." Grant, Water Apportionment Compacts,supra note 127, § 46.04.
238. See, e.g., Bayou Land Co. v. Talley, 924 P.2d 136, 150 (Colo. 1996); Nielson v.
Newmyer, 228 P.2d 456, 458 (Colo. 1951); Posey v. Dove, 257 P.2d 541, 547 (N.M. 1953);
N.M. Products Co. v. N.M. Power Co., 77 P.2d 634,641 (N.M. 1937).
239. Clodfelter v. Reynolds, 358 P.2d 626, 630 (N.M. 1961).
240. Although water statutes are generally silent on restraints on the alienation of
property, the concept does come up in other contexts. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3830-165 (West 2000) (real estate).
241. Rio Grande Compact, pmbl, 53 Stat. 785, 785 (1939).
242. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso 1), 563 F. Supp. 379, 387 (D.N.M. 1983), affd on
reh'g, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
243. Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 952 (1982).
244. El Paso 1, 563 F. Supp. at 381.
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Texas and New Mexico including hydrologically connected ground
water.245 The court disagreed, saying that the compact did not include
hydrologically connected ground water. In fact, the compact makes no
mention of ground water at all. 246 In New Mexico, thousands of wells
had been drilled after the compact was signed, without taking into
account the compact requirements. New Mexico had not linked ground
water to surface water in its permitting process until the Texas
application was made. The failure to do so was a sign of
discrimination. 247 The court decided a Commerce Clause violation
occurred when the statute allowed a New Mexico citizen to get a permit
but El Paso could not. The absence of any reference to ground water in
the Compact means groundwater transfer laws cannot be excluded from
Commerce Clause scrutiny through use of the Compact. 248
As can be seen from this discussion, the Rio Grande Compact
does not have "expressly stated" limitations on out-of-state transfers or
"unmistakably clear" limiting language. Without this as an element,
Congress could not have "affirmatively contemplated" a potential
burden on commerce when they approved the Compact. To determine if
there is anything that might change this evaluation, we will examine the
court cases that interpret the Compact.
B. Court Interpretations of the Compact
Several decisions have interpreted the Compact, but most do not
shed much light on the issue presented here. Many of the cases that
discuss the Compact say that it creates an "obligation" to deliver water
to the Colorado/New Mexico border 249 or to Elephant Butte Reservoir. 25°
This reference to an "obligation" to deliver is simply a reflection of the
language of the Compact and does nothing to define what it means. As
discussed above, an obligation to deliver is not a permanent and
245. Id. at 383.
246. Id. at 387.
247. Id. at 387-88.
248. Id. at 388-92.
249. In re Rules and Regulations Governing the Use, Control, and Protection of Water
Rights for Both Surface and Underground Water Located in the Rio Grande and Conejos
River Basins and their Tributaries (Conejos Basin), 674 P.2d 914, 917 (Colo. 1983) (the
compact creates "separate obligations for deliveries" from the Conejos, a tributary of the
Rio Grande, and the main stem of the Rio Grande in Colorado); Cabeza de Vaca Land &
Cattle Co. v. Babbitt, 58 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1228 (D.Colo. 1999); Closed Basin Landowners
Ass'n v. Rio Grande Water Conservation Dist., 734 P.2d 627, 629 (Colo. 1987).
250. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist. v. Regents of N.M. State Univ., 849 P. 2d 372, 378
(N.M. Ct. App. 1993); United States v. City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d 1170, 1185 (10th Cir.
2002).
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unalterable condition. Although one case does refer to the Compact as
being "permanent," the case could be interpreted as referring to the
permanence of the compact rather than making the allocation specified
in the compact permanent. 25 1 The court cases also refer to the intent of
the Compact as creating an equitable apportionment between the
states. 25 2 An equitable apportionment either through a compact or by
Supreme Court decision takes precedence over rights created by state
law, 25 3 and strictly following the priority system created under state law
may not be possible. 254 As discussed above, equitable apportionment is
meant to be a flexible doctrine.
One case does specifically interpret relevant parts of the
compact. 2ss The El Paso decision discussed above also addressed the
question of the compact's apportionment of the river. The court held that
the compact did not apportion the water between Texas and New
Mexico. In the compact, New Mexico is obligated to deliver water at
Elephant Butte Reservoir, 100 miles upstream from the Texas/New
Mexico border. Water from the reservoir is used to irrigate land in Texas
(43%) and New Mexico (57%). There is no explicit language in the
Compact that apportions a specified portion of water to Texas and Texas
alone. The court said that the Compact apportions water between
"Colorado and the downstream states; it then apportions the remaining
water between the New Mexican appropriators above Elephant Butte
and the New Mexican, Texan and Mexican appropriators below
Elephant Butte." 256 The actual allocation to Texas is made according to a
contract between the Bureau of Reclamation, which operates Elephant
Butte, and the farmers of the Texas irrigation district.
The case also discusses whether ground water is included in the
Compact. El Paso wanted to export ground water from New Mexico,
251. Conejos Basin, 674 P. 2d at 918. This case also says the "compact fixes Colorado's
overall obligation in the equitable interstate apportionment of the Rio Grande at a level
intended to protect water use as it existed from 1928-1937." Id. at 919. Fixing an obligation
at a level of use that existed when the compact was signed is not the same as saying
existing water rights cannot be sold to the highest bidder. This was a dispute internal to
Colorado and the issue was much more restrictive. Similar language of permanence is
found in the historic record of negotiation cited in El PasoL City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El
Paso 1), 563 F. Supp. 379, 385 (D.N.M. 1983), affd on reh'g,597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
252. Conejos Basin, 674 P.2d at 922-23; City of Las Cruces, 289 F.3d at 1176; United States
v. Elephant Butte Irrigation Dist., No. CV 97-803 JP/RLP, 2000 U.S. Dist. Lexis 17421, at *8
(D.N.M. Aug 22, 2000).
253. Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,106 (1938).
254. Conejos Basin, 674 P. 2d at 922-23; Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 180, 18384 (1982); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945); Hinderlider,304 U.S. at 98.
255. El Paso 1, 563 F. Supp. 379.
256. Id. at 385.
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some of which was hydrologically connected to the Rio Grande. New
Mexico had a statute preventing water exports. The court found the
export ban to be facially discriminatory and thus subject to the strictest
scrutiny. 257 Although the court recognized that conservation of water
was important to New Mexico, they nonetheless found the statute
unconstitutional. 2 8 New Mexico also argued that the Compact effected
an equitable apportionment of the ground water downstream from
Elephant Butte Dam. However, the compact makes no mention of
ground water, and New Mexico had allowed thousands of wells to be
developed without considering the impact on compact waters. 2 9 The
court recognized the ability of New Mexico to manage surface and
ground water conjunctively but stressed that the management must be
applied evenhandedly to in-state and out-of-state interests. In a
subsequent decision in the same court, this interpretation of the compact
was reaffirmed. 260
VI. STATE TRANSFER LAWS
After Sporhase, states began to modify their transfer statutes to
comply with Commerce Clause requirements. 261 The Court said that
there were circumstances that would allow a state to restrict out-of-state
transfers, but the circumstances allowing such restrictions were not
clearly defined. The Court gave some clues, however, as to what they
meant. The Sporhase decision upheld part of Nebraska's law requiring
the transfer to be reasonable, not contrary to conservation, and not
detrimental to public welfare. 262 The Court also said that a state could
favor its own citizens in time of shortage. 263 Even a total ban on exports
might be acceptable under some circumstances if needed for
conservation and preservation. 264 With these somewhat fuzzy guidelines,
states began to modify their water laws controlling exports.
257. Id. at 388.
258. Id. at 392.
259. Id. at 387.
260. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso I), 597 F. Supp. 694,707 (D.N.M. 1984).
261. See generally Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export, supra note 23; Stephen
D. Harrison, Note, Interstate Transfer of Water: The Western Challenge to the Commerce Clause,
59 TEX. L. REv. 1249 (1981).
262. Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 944. The case went on to use
the Pike balancing test to determine the validity of this statute. Id. at 954 (citing Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
263. Sporhase,458 U.S. at 957.
264. Id. at 958. See also City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso 1), 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M.
1983), affd on reh'g, 597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984) (the health of the economy is not an
acceptable reason). But see Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (a ban on baitfish upheld).
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Several general approaches have been taken by the states.
Clearly, reasonableness, conservation, and public welfare criteria will be
upheld unless these standards are applied in a discriminatory fashion.
New Mexico, 265 Montana, 266 Arizona, 267 Idaho,268 Utah, 269 Colorado, 270
and Nebraska 271 all have statutes that use these criteria or a modified
version of them. Some states now require legislative approval of all
exports. 272 Other states have attempted to limit transfers to the
watershed in which the water originates. 273 New Mexico used a time
limit to deny El Paso's appropriation of New Mexico water. El Paso
would not need the water for 40 years, which was beyond New Mexico's
statutory limit on appropriations for future use. 274 The requirements of
Colorado and New Mexico are examined in more detail to see how they
would stand up to Commerce Clause scrutiny.
Colorado statutes allow in-state transfers with prior judicial
approval. 275 The water court will not grant approval if other water right
holders will be injured. 276 Two issues must be addressed in Colorado
before water transfers are allowed: the historic beneficial use of water
277
and conditions to be imposed to prevent injury to other users.
Colorado has also attempted to restrict exports with its water export
statute and by many other means.278 For example, Colorado has
265. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-12B-1, 72-5-23 (1978).
266. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-141(7) (2005), 85-2-311(4) (2005), 85-2-316(4) (2005).
267. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-292 (2003).
268. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-203A(5) (2003), 42-222(1) (Supp. 2006), 42-401(1) (2003).
269. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3a-101 (Supp. 2006).
270. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-81-101(3)(a-c) (West 2004); see also Guy, supranote 148;
Miller, supranote 148.
271. NEB. REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (2004).
272. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-108 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-402(5-6) (2005); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1085.2(2) (West Supp. 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 (2003); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 46-5-20.1 (2004); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 41-3-115 (1999).
273. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.035 (2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 105.12(4) (West Supp.
2007). See also sources cited supra note 10.
274. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-1-9 (1999).
275. See generally James N. Corbridge, Jr., HistoricalWater Use and the Protectionof Vested
Rights: A Challenge to Colorado Water Law, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 503 (1998).
276. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-90-102, 37-92-103, 37-92-302, 37-92-305 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2006).
277. Santa Fe Trail Ranches Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Simpson, 990 P. 2d 46, 53 (Colo.
1999).
278. When developers proposed to take ground water from the San Luis Valley's closed
basin and ship it to the front range, residents of the valley rallied and did everything
possible to prevent the export. Quillen, supra note 4. Two initiatives designed to facilitate
the out-of-basin move were defeated at the polls. Earlier threats to the valley's water had
also occurred. In order to prevent threats of this nature and to avoid potential Commerce
Clause problems, title XV of the Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustments Act
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additional requirements for out-of-state exports. The exports must be
consistent with reasonable conservation and they must not deprive the
citizens of Colorado of any water apportioned by compacts or court
decrees. 279 The reasonable conservation provision is acceptable under the
Sporhase decision, and a variant of this has been adopted in many
states. 2 The provision stating that Colorado citizens cannot be deprived
of water apportioned by compact or judicial decree is more problematic.
The state cannot enlarge the rights granted by decree or compact by this
provision. Other provisions attempt to limit groundwater exports by
saying any such export will be credited to compact delivery

of 1992 attempted to limit the removal of water from the valley. Pub. L. No. 102-575 § 1501,
106 Stat. 4600, 4663 (1992). Entitled "San Luis Valley Protection, Colorado," the provision
states:
(a) No agency or instrumentality of the United States shall issue any
permit, license, right-of-way, grant, loan or other authorization or
assistance for any project or feature of any project to withdraw water from
the San Luis Valley, Colorado, for export to another basin in Colorado or
export to any portion of another State, unless the Secretary of the Interior
determines, after due consideration of all findings provided by the
Colorado Water Conservation Board, that the project will not: (1) increase
the costs or negatively affect operation of the Closed Basin Project; (2)
adversely affect the purposes of any national wildlife refuge or Federal
wildlife habitat area withdrawal located in the San Luis Valley, Colorado;
or (3) adversely affect the purposes of the Great Sand Dunes National
Monument, Colorado.
(b) Nothing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, or limit any
provision of Federal or State law that applies to any project or feature of a
project to withdraw water from the San Luis Valley, Colorado, for export
to another basin in Colorado or another State. Nothing in this title shall be
construed to limit any agency's authority or responsibility to reject, limit,
or condition any such project on any basis independent of the
requirements of this title.
Id. § 1501(a). On its face this appears to be a significant limitation on the transfer of water
outside the state. Federal agencies cannot grant a right of way or issue a permit if the listed
adverse conditions arise. However, the conditions are essentially meaningless as additional
constraints on water transfers. Although this provision might have some impact on new
water rights established in the closed basin, it will have no impact on the sale of existing
rights. In addition, this provision is not likely to pass Commerce Clause muster. In order
for a federal exception to the Commerce Clause to apply, the federal statute must be
affirmatively considered by Congress, and there must be a clear affirmation of intent to
allow a burden on commerce. Although the language of the bill seems clear, the manner of
its passage indicates that the provision received no real consideration by Congress. This
particular provision is buried along with dozens of others in an authorization bill. Even the
title is misleading if the intent of the provision is really to prevent water exports.
279. COL. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101(3)(a-c) (2004).
280. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1 (1978); Grant, State Regulation of Interstate Water Export,
supra note 23, § 48.03(c)(1).
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requirements. Colorado cannot unilaterally add such restrictions to
compacts.2 l
Before approving a transfer outside the state, the Colorado State
Engineer must determine that "[t]he proposed use of water outside this
state is expressly authorized by interstate compact.... "282 This is an
attempt to make compact allocations permanent by saying water exports
can only occur if the compact expressly authorizes the export. 2w This
provision will not withstand Commerce Clause scrutiny. The exception
to the Commerce Clause requires Congress to consent to an impairment
of commerce. Congress does not have to expressly authorize an export
from a state as required by Colorado's statute. Colorado has not signed
any compacts expressly authorizing out-of-state transfers. The only
compacts Colorado has signed expressly authorizing a limitation on
commerce is the language of permanence found in the compacts on the
Colorado River. A similar statute states that water transported to a
destination outside the state will only be allowed if the volume exported
is attributed to the importing state's compact allocation.2 4 This
requirement is another attempt to write into the compact a provision
violating the Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause requires an
express statement by Congress before an exception to it is applicable. A
Colorado statute cannot put language into a compact that was not there
when Congress consented to the compact.
In New Mexico, some transfer provisions are similar. Out-ofstate transfers are allowed, but they are conditioned. New Mexico allows
transfers with the approval of the State Engineer.25 The transfers cannot
be detrimental to conservation or the public welfare. 226 Transfers are not
allowed if injury will occur to others.28 7 In addition to the regulations on
in-state transfers, New Mexico has requirements for out-of-state
transfers. These include looking at the New Mexico water supply,
demand, shortage potential, and whether the water could be used to
satisfy water shortages in New Mexico. As part of the transfer process,
the water supply and demand in the importing state will also be
examined. 288 Although the statute was challenged in federal court and
281. COL. REV. STAT. § 37-81-103 (2004). See also Robert C. Kerr, Water Export, 13 COLO.
LAW. 1004 (1984); Richard C. Cauble, Comment, Do State Restrictions on Water Use by Slurry
Pipelines Violate the Commerce Clause?,53 U. COLO. L. REV. 655, 671 (1982).
282. COL. REV. STAT. § 37-81-101(3)(a) (2004).
283. See generally Miller, supra note 148; Kerr, supranote 281.
284. COL. REV. STAT. § 37-81-103(1) (2004).
285. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-23 to 72-5-25, 72-5A-8, 72-12-7 (1978 & Supp. 2006).
286. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (1978).
287. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-5-23, 72-5-25 (1978).
288. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12B-1(D)(5-6) (1978).
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was found constitutional on its face, the statute would have more
difficulty in preventing the transfer of existing rights. The state
subsequently imposed conservation and public welfare limits on in-state
transfers. 289 Still, the state cannot use these provisions to discriminate
against out-of-state transfers.
VII. ANALYSIS
Without explicit language in a compact, a court must be willing
to imply that the parties to the compact intended that there should be no
exports across state boundaries and that Congress understood that was
their intent when the compact was approved. This may be too much of a
stretch for a court when a constitutional provision will be abrogated. In
order to imply that a compact allows a permissible burden on interstate
commerce, the court would have to imply that the division of water
found in the compact was meant as a permanent, immutable allocation
rather than an initial allocation. In general, when a compact is put into
place, it defines the amount of water that is to go to each state and the
division of water between rights holders in each state is left to state law.
Therefore, if a private water right holder in an upstream state wants to
sell water to someone, it is the law of the upstream state that applies. The
sale of water within a state must have been contemplated during
compact negotiations because all western states have some kind of
process in place for the sale of water rights. However, if the state has
export bans or does not allow the water to be moved outside a
watershed, they run into constitutional problems with the Commerce
Clause as discussed above. Under normal state law then, there are
currently no statutory prohibitions against the movement or sale of
water across a state boundary. If export bans are not allowed under state
law, how can they be implied in a compact that has absolutely no
language on sales or transfers?
The counter argument is that when the compacts were signed,
states had export bans. It is possible that some states felt the compact
was a permanent division of water without the possibility of any future
transfer across state boundaries. Often, however, the states said their
intent was to achieve an equitable apportionment of water. The Supreme
Court developed the doctrine of equitable apportionment as a means to
divide water between two states. This doctrine is flexible since equity
changes with time and circumstances. 290 If the division of water in a
compact is based on this concept, then a permanent inflexible division
289.
290.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-5-23 (1978).
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982).
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could not have been intended. Regardless of the intent of the states
signing a compact, it is the intent of Congress that is the key. The
Commerce Clause can only be burdened by Congress, not the states. A
permanent division of water by Congress would require an acceptance
of the following possibilities. A farmer in an upstream state can sell
water to anyone inside their state. But she cannot sell water to her
downstream neighbor across a state line in the same watershed. A
private party from a state that is not signatory to the compact can buy
compact water but not those people living in a state that is a party to the
compact. This seems a strange set of outcomes, but this is the logical
result if compacts are implied to be permanent divisions. Surely
Congress did not intend this when approving compacts unless there is
specific language indicating it. The Commerce Clause is designed to
encourage free trade, and Congress would not impede this right without
serious consideration of the consequences.
The better argument is that the compacts provided an initial
allocation of water between states. After this allocation is made, state
water law controls any sale or transfer of the water right. Sales can take
place across state boundaries, but the law of the state where the right
was established controls the transaction. Even after the water is
transferred to another state, the originating state still controls the use of
water and the out-of-state user must comply with the state law where
the right was obtained. In evaluating whether New Mexico could control
El Paso's use of the water, the court in El Paso I states, "Interstate usage
of water can be restricted and controlled to the same extent as intrastate
usage." 291 Transfers out of state should be treated as any other transfer
and should not count against the downstream state's compact allocation.
To allow any other interpretation would create serious harm to interstate
water markets. An example may be helpful.
To simplify this hypothetical example, only two states have
signed the compact -Upstream and Downstream. The compact has been
approved by Congress. When the compact was signed, both states had
laws prohibiting exports of water. The method for allocating the river's
water between the two states is based on a percentage of the river's flow
as it passes a given point. The percentage for each state is the same every
year, but the actual volume going to each state varies with the volume of
water in the river. No mention is made of ground water in the compact.
The state named Upstream uses almost all its allocation for irrigated
agriculture. Typical production is potatoes, wheat, barley, and alfalfa.

291. City of El Paso v. Reynolds (El Paso 1), 563 F. Supp. 379 (D.N.M. 1983), affd on reh'g,
597 F. Supp. 694 (D.N.M. 1984).
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Those farmers who have low priorities will use their water for irrigated
pasture in the years when there is enough water, and in dry years they
will not irrigate anything. Since the compact was signed, many permits
for the use of ground water have been granted and some groundwater
rights have been sold.
In Downstream there is a large city that has a high growth rate
and a shortage of water. A similar city exists in Upstream, but it is
outside the watershed of the compact river. In order to protect farmers'
water from raids by the cities, a law is passed in Upstream prohibiting
the export of water from the basin. The reason for the law is to protect
the farm economy of the basin. The city in Upstream makes a deal to buy
the water rights of a small irrigation district located in Upstream. The
city in Downstream applies for a transfer of Upstream water rights to
take ground water from an aquifer hydrologically connected with the
compact river. A city in a state that is not a party to the compact also
wants to buy water from an Upstream irrigation district. The cities all
apply to Upstream's State Engineer for a transfer of the water rights and
are denied permission. Upstream's city and the city from the state not
party to the compact are denied because water cannot be transferred
outside the basin. Downstream's city is denied because the compact
allegedly made a permanent division of the river, and the ground water
is hydrologically connected to it. All three cities sue.
If a court were presented with this case, the outcome would
probably be as follows. The prohibition against water transfers outside
the basin is blatantly unconstitutional unless it is a federal statute. The
prohibition was done for economic protectionism, which is completely
contrary to the Commerce Clause. It is discriminatory when a city
outside the state applies for a transfer and is refused, especially when
transfers within the basin are allowed. With the ban on exports outside
the basin found unconstitutional, the city in Upstream would no longer
have a barrier to water movement.
The city inside the basin but located in Downstream should be
able to get a permit to transfer ground water. Ground water is not
explicitly mentioned in the compact, and groundwater rights have been
sold inside Upstream. The only hope Upstream has is if the court implies
that ground water was included in the compact. As was seen in the El
Paso case, the courts are reluctant to imply that compacts have provisions
that abrogate the Commerce Clause. Compacts need to be explicit on
this, but they seldom are.
The remaining possibility is to determine what would happen if
the city in Downstream applied for a permit to transfer a water right
covered by the compact. The court would have to imply that Congress
intended no sales were to take place across a state boundary when it
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approved the compact. Because sales are allowed under state laws,
something explicit is needed in the compact.
Courts have also been reluctant to put constraints on the
alienation of property. This would be the result if a prohibition on sales
across state borders were implied. In our hypothetical example, farmers
are being offered money by the downstream city for their water rights. If
the city offers $5,000 an acre-foot to buy water and there is no local offer
or the offer is only $100 an acre-foot, then farmers will want to take the
highest offer. If the compact makes a permanent division of water, they
would not be able to do so because such transfers are not allowed under
the compact. The farmer would not be able to sell for $5,000 and would
be limited to $100 or no sale at all. Courts should be very reluctant to
imply such limitations in a compact because this would be a constraint
on the alienation of property. If the goal is improving efficiency, such
limitations are contrary to achieving this goal.
On the other side, one could argue that nothing explicit was put
in the compact because both states had laws prohibiting exports, but the
intent was implicitly there because of the statutes. The fact that the
statutes were both unconstitutional would probably be enough to defeat
this argument. Even if the states intended the division to be permanent,
saying Congress intended to override the Commerce Clause by
approving the compact is a reach. Sales of water rights were
contemplated when the compact was signed as is allowed under each
state's laws. If the sales were to be limited to in-state sales or limited to
sales within the basin, the compact should be explicit.
No insurmountable administrative hardship will occur in
Upstream as a result of such a sale. Upstream currently has an obligation
to deliver a certain volume of water as specified by the terms of the
compact. After the sale, that obligation will continue. If the sale is to the
Downstream city, the water delivered will be the volume specified in the
compact plus the volume of water allowed to be transferred under
Upstream's water law. The priority date will remain the same and any
future transfers must be in accordance with Upstream's laws. This is
what would happen if any sale were made.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Transfers like the one discussed in the hypothetical example will
be attempted in the future. Because the stakes are so high, strong
resistance is likely to be met. The actual outcome is not completely
certain and will depend on the language of the compacts as well as the
intent of Congress and the state signatories as interpreted by the courts.
The better argument in most instances will be that the compacts were an
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initial division of water between states, and state law on water transfers
should control subsequently. Today, state law cannot prohibit transfers
across state lines except under very narrow circumstances. With that
said, the example above remains hypothetical and so does the solution
suggested. Until this issue is clarified in court, the resulting uncertainty
can hinder water marketing. If the interpretation here is correct,
compacts will not be a barrier to marketing water in the future.

